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INTRODUCTION

The law is an applied science which involves the analytic application of legal norms to fact patterns.1 Practicing attorneys assume the
responsibility for discovering the relevant facts underlying a client's request for legal representation and determining how these facts may fit
into an established legal framework. This legal framework is generally
characterized by legal precedent, 2 statutes or codes, and judges' personal predilections. 3
The practice of law also involves a combination of inductive 4 and
deductive legal reasoning. 5 Benjamin Cardozo identifies four distinct
aspects of legal reasoning: logical analysis, historical development, custom, and social justice. 6 Of these four aspects, only the first is purely
1. See R. MOORE, LEGAL NORMS AND LEGAL SCIENCE 2-7, 42-109 (1978) (analysis of
Kelsen's conception of legal science as merely "schemes of interpretation").
2. See E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1-2 (1949) ("[T]he basic pattern of legal reasoning ... is a three-step process described by the doctrine of precedent in
which... similarity is seen between cases; next the rule of law inherent in the first case is
announced; then the rule of law is made applicable to the second case.").
3. See generally D. BURTON, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR.: WHAT MANNER OF LIBERAL? (1979) (analysis of Holmes' treatise on legal realism-THE PATH OF THE LAW); K.
LLEWELYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH (1960) (legal realism); J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN
MIND (1963) (legal realism); D. MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY
(1978) (legal realism). See also infra text accompanying notes 97-98.
4. See D. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 25-27 (1985)
(people generally use inductive reasoning in day-to-day activities).
5. See generally I. COPI, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC (6th ed. 1982). Deductive reasoning
is a method of analysis where the antecedent necessarily entails the conclusion. For example, an antecedent composed of the premises "If I live in Pittsburgh, then I live in
Pennsylvania" and "I live in Pittsburgh" necessarily entails the conclusion "I live in
Pennsylvania." See infra text accompanying notes 10-22.
6. See B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 21-23 (1921) (Lecture I in
a collection of Cardozo lectures presented in 1921 at Yale University).
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deductive in nature and, therefore, most suited to computing.7
The goal of this paper is to explore the possibilities of devising a
computerized expert legal system which is capable of deriving legal conclusions and giving legal advice based on a particular fact situation. In
order to reach legal conclusions, such a system should draw upon a
knowledge base composed of codes, statutes, and common law. Furthermore, the system should determine whether particular codes, statutes,
or precedent mandate a result in each case.
Such a system is currently technologically infeasible. Technology
aside, however, a computerized expert legal system is inherently limited
by the inability of humans to program computers to accurately recognize the realm of human relationships, reason inductively, or represent
legal knowledge. Each of these obstacles are knowledge representation
problems which can be surmounted only by encoding tremendous
amounts of information and formal reasoning procedures as data structures. This paper will analyze these knowledge representation
problems, suggest a means toward their resolution, and offer an expert
legal system which models common law legal reasoning using essentially deductive reasoning.
II.

THE KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION PROBLEM
EXPLAINED: THE HUMAN MIND MODEL

The ability of a computer to store the bulk of legal doctrine in
memory presents relatively few theoretical problems. However, this
poses the immense practical problem of ascertaining the bulk of legal
doctrine and transcribing it into a form which computers can understand. In order to effectively store and manipulate data of any amount,
a computer must have a cross-indexing scheme. An illustration of the
type of cross-indexing system used in computer systems may be found
in the human mind.
It is believed that observed facts are processed by the hippocampus,
and are stored as memories in the cerebral cortex.8 One school of
thought suggests a "subject model" concept of memory storage in which
long-term memory is arranged in the cerebral cortex by subject.9 Memories are formed through the brain's information pathways-pathways
referred to as "traces." This "subject model" of memory storage sug7. See Walter, Introduction,in COMPUTING POWER AND LEGAL REASONING 4 (C. Walter ed. 1985). Because the goal of the law is justice rather than truth, legal questions elicit
inductive analysis founded on open-textured technical concepts with dynamic definitions
and interpretations. Id. Nevertheless, deductive aspects of legal analysis may readily be
executed with the aid of computers. Id.
8. See Hinko & Pearlmutter, Effects of Arginine Vasopressin on Protein Phosphorylation in Rat HippocampalSynaptic Membranes, 17 J. NEUROSCIENCE RES. 71-79 (1987).
9. See, e.g., Memory, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 29, 1986, at 45-54.
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gests that subjects are arranged by relevant words known as "mnemonics." A mnemonic device generally engrains a fact in the cerebral
cortex by means of a clearly established trace. However, according to
this theory, even though particular memories are processed by one's
brain, they may, nevertheless, become irretrievable, that is, "forgotten,"
when their respective traces are unclear.
The subject model suggests that the ideal design for tailoring a
computerized expert legal system should be based upon mnemonic
traces. As a result, developers of expert legal systems are faced with
the immense task of devising an indexing system which can store vast
amounts of information, and which can recall the same information
through a variety of traces.
III.

LOGIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS

Legal reasoning involves the application of historical development,
custom, social justice and logic.' 0 Legal analysis has been described as
the logical derivation of legal conclusions from particular fact situations
in light of some body of legal doctrine." Insofar as any and all logical
systems can be computerized, 12 and insofar as legal analysis involves
logic, legal analysis can be computerized.
A computer is essentially a machine for explicating a logical system.' 3 Computers lend themselves to logical analysis mainly through
three different logic operations: "tests," "conditional branches," and
"repeats."' 14 Tests cause the comparison between two pieces of data.
Conditional branches cause the computer to adjust its operation and
change the sequence of steps the computer carries out. The repeat
function allows a computer to repeat a set of instructions. Although
these functions alone do not appear to be very powerful, a standard personal computer can perform more than 600,000 conditional branch operations every second.' 5 Thus, by repeating these three basic logical
functions, computers can perform almost any kind of logical analysis.
To the extent that legal analysis involves logical analysis, legal
analysis is composed of two modes of logical reasoning: deductive and
inductive reasoning. 1 6 Deductive analysis lends itself to computerization. Inductive analysis, however, involves classification of attributes
10. See Meldman, A StructuralModel for Computer-Aided Legal Analysis, 6 J. COMPUTERS & L. 27, 30 (1977) (citing Cardozo).

11. Id. at 30.
12. See Leith & Philip, Logic, FormalModels and Legal Reasoning, 24 JURIMETRICS J.
334 (1984).
13. Id.
14. See P. NORTON, INSIDE THE IBM PC 76 (1986).
15. Id. at 78.
16. Leith & Philip, supra note 12, at 348.
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and classes to determine similarities and differences with existing fact
patterns. For a computer to perform inductive reasoning, it must be
able to recognize class distinctions and relationships between those
classes.
Deductive and inductive arguments are sometimes distinguished
from one another in terms of the relative generality of their premises
and conclusions. 17 For instance, deductive reasoning is the process of
inferring the particular from the general. This is best illustrated by the
following classic example:
All humans are mortal.
Socrates is human.
Therefore, Socrates is mortal.
Conversely, inductive reasoning is the process of inferring the general from the particular.' 8 The following is an example of an inductive
argument:
Socrates is a human and is mortal.
Bob Hope is a human and is mortal.
Ronald Reagan is a human and is mortal.
Rene Descartes is a human and is mortal.
Therefore, all humans are mortal.
While the relative generality of premises is one factor distinguishing between deductive and inductive reasoning another, more convincing, factor arguably differentiates the two. 1 9 Specifically, in a deductive
argument, the conclusion follows from the premises with absolute necessity. However, in an inductive argument, the conclusion follows only
with a degree of probability which is less than certainty. Thus, an inductive conclusion is subject to change by the introduction of
counterexamples.
There are three types of inductive arguments, each of which uses a
distinct mechanism. 20 First, inductive reasoning may proceed by analogy. Analogy involves inferring resemblance between two objectsclass attributes of a first object are recognized, and a second object is
determined to be either a member or a non-member of those same
classes.
Second, inductive reasoning may proceed by generalization. Generalization may occur when two or more objects share two particular
characteristics, and where a class of additional objects share one of the
two particular characteristics. Through the generalization process, the
second particular characteristic is inferentially attributed to all of the
17.
18.
19.
20.

I. CoPi, supra note 5, at 51.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 54.
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21
additional objects as well.

Finally, inductive reasoning may operate by means of a "cause-andeffect" analysis. A causal connection is inferred between events or
22
characteristics which frequently seem to occur or appear together.
Although people generally reason inductively, legal analysis is essentially deductive. Where the fact pattern of a particular case fits
within the scope of an established rule, a particular legal conclusion will
necessarily follow. The clearest example of the deductive nature of
legal analysis is found in the application of strict liability laws. Not all
fact patterns, however, fit neatly under a rule of law.
Sometimes cases which involve almost identical fact situations may
result in conflicting holdings. Thus, while the fact situations may be
similar at first glance, there is at least one factor which legally distinguishes the two. It is in such instances that the ideal expert legal system will have to use inductive reasoning to determine the distinguishing
factor. Unfortunately, programming a computer to recognize legally
relevant facts is the greatest obstacle to automating inductive reasoning.
If an expert legal system could discern legally relevant facts, it could
then determine similar fact patterns, and apply established rules of law
to particular cases.
IV.

COMPUTERIZED LEGAL ANALYSIS

As discussed above, lawyers can store and trigger cases and concepts in their minds through the use of natural language tags. 23 Similarly, computerized legal analysis requires concepts to be classified
under computerized tags, so that the relevant information may be retrieved when needed. However, formulating computerized tags
presents a knowledge representation problem.
Since the 1960s, much attention and effort has been directed toward
the use of computers to retrieve data in order to expedite the process of
legal research. 24 Prior to the 1960s, lawyers were forced to manually
search for all relevant constitutions, statutes, and case law. Although
constitutions are relatively brief, statutes, codes, and case law comprise
the bulk of legal knowledge and require huge libraries to store them in
printed form. "Accompanying indices" and "digests" have been developed in order to enable practitioners to sort through this morass. One
such indexing scheme is the West Key Number System. 25 The West
21. See supra text accompanying notes 18-19 (the "Socrates" example of inductive
reasoning).
22. I. COPI, supra note 5, at 54.
23. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
24. Meldman, supra note 10, at 40.
25. The "West Key Number System" is a copyright of West Publishing Company.
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system breaks all legal concepts down into West "topics" and assigns
key numbers to both these topics and sub-topics. Legal concepts are
thereby arranged in a hierarchic structure with major topics at the top
of the structure and specific holdings at the bottom. However, even
with these numeric aids, manually locating relevant statute sections,
code sections, or cases is often inefficient and ineffective. A better solution may be computerizing legal indexing schemes and the body of legal
knowledge.
LEXIS and WestLaw are the foremost attempts at computerizing
legal retrieval systems. Both operate via a method of keyword search
known as "key-word-in-combination." These systems require the user
to input key words or phrases to retrieve the cases containing the same
key words or phrases. LEXIS and WestLaw are inherently ineffective,
however, because the key word or phrase input and searched is not necessarily connected to the context of the case in which it appears.
WestLaw is relatively more effective than LEXIS since, in addition to
mere words, a user may input West Key Number System topic and subtopic numbers. However, even WestLaw is inefficient because it is still
overly broad and often retrieves large amounts of irrelevant
information.
For example, suppose one wishes to research whether intentionally
grabbing a book from another's hand is a battery. An appropriate key
phrase to input into the system might be the following:
battery & "unconsented to grab*"
The ampersand requires the system to retrieve only those cases which
contain all key words or phrases which appear on both sides of the ampersand; the asterisk tells the system to retrieve all variations of the
root word immediately preceding the asterisk; and the quotation marks
tell the system to retrieve the enclosed phrase in its exact form. This
particular search did not retrieve any cases in either the "all federal" or
"all state" database. 26 Perhaps limiting the search to an "unconsented
to" "grab" was the factor which caused the search to fail. Perhaps it
would be less restrictive if the key phrase included only the word "unconsented" in the same sentence as the word "grab" without requiring
them to be immediately next to each other. Hence, a new search might
appear as follows:
battery & unconsented /s grab*
The signal "/s" requires the system to retrieve cases where both key
words on either side of the "/s" appear in the same sentence. As expected, several cases satisfied this search. However, only one case was
directly on point-the others were irrelevant.
Thus, oftentimes a LEXIS or WestLaw search results in cases
26. Both LEXIS and WestLaw enable the user to research particular jurisdictions.
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which bear no relationship to the particular issue the user is researching. A query often retrieves irrelevant information, and the information that is relevant is sometimes overlooked by the system because the
user's key word or phrase does not precisely fit the appropriate case.
V.

COMPUTER MODELING OF LEGAL CONCEPTS

To correct these problems, the query should be based on the legal
concepts being researched.2 7 In order to permit concept-based legal research, programmers must surmount the knowledge representation
problem involved in modeling these concepts for use by computers.
One such system for overcoming the knowledge representation
problem was proposed by Wesley Hohfeld in 1919.28 Hohfeld based his
system of analysis on four elements: rights, powers, privileges and immunities and their counterparts: duties, no-rights, liabilities, and disabilities. 29 Legal analysis, according to Hohfeld, is only a matter of
following a set of logical rules that operate on these elements. However, Hohfeld's approach, and the entire field of analytical jurispru30
dence, was not well received in his time.
More recent efforts include the work of Georg von Wright, who developed an analytical model called deontic logic. 31 Von Wright used
mathematical logic to describe the obligations that run between people.
While von Wright was not a lawyer, his system resembles Hohfeld's.
Like Hohfeld's system, von Wright's deals with commands and permissions, states of affairs, and transitions between states.
Layman Allen constructed a model of legal analysis using symbolic
logic and propositional calculus. 32 To Allen, a statement of legal doctrine may be paraphrased in the form of two propositions: one proposition is a set of legal consequences and the other is a set of conditions
that imply these consequences. 33 For example, a legal consequence will
follow when condition 1, condition 2, etc. are satisfied. This method of
legal analysis is similar to the propositional calculus of the programming language "Prolog.

' 34

Another commentator suggests the use of structural representa27. See Krovetz, The Use of Knowledge Representation Formalisms in the Modeling
of Legal Concepts, in COMPUTER POWER AND LEGAL REASONING 275 (C. Walter ed. 1985).
28. See generally W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN
JUDICIAL REASONING (1919).

29. Meldman, supra note 10, at 34.
30. Id.
31. G. VON WRIGHT, NORM AND ACTION (1963).
32. Allen, Symbolic Logic: A Razor Edge Tool for Drafting and InterpretingLegal
Documents, 66 YALE L.J. 833 (1957).
33. Meldman, supra note 10, at 37.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 53-54.
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tions. 35 "These representations comprise relatively complicated structures assembled from primitive data items that represent relatively
simple things and relations in the everyday world. '36 This model portrays factual situations as "things" and "relations." Things and relations are distinguishable since relations always run from one thing to a
second thing.37 Meldman contends that if the relational structure of the
factual components is explicitly represented, it is likely that a case re38
trieval system would find fewer irrelevant cases.
It is important to note that a system which takes into account relational structures has never been implemented because, regardless of the
model used, large numbers of cases would have to be translated into
representational data structures. As a result, it is uncertain whether
these systems would provide improved performance.
VI.

OTHER KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION TECHNIQUES

A.

PATTERN MATCHING

Pattern matching may be used to organize an expert legal system
based on pattern recognition rather than reasoning. Legal concepts may
be defined as a particular series of bits. Each bit represents the presence or absence of an attribute which a legal expert/programmer has
deemed important in the definition of that legal concept. A legal conclusion follows when the system finds that the pattern of bits in the
definition matches the user-defined pattern.
Pattern recognition programs are usually based on classifier systems; that is, information about a set of conditions is encoded as a string
of bits with each bit representing a specific feature that is typically binary in nature. 39 A classifier system also allows the expert to weight
the relative importance of the presence or absence of each bit.
An example of such a classifier system is as follows:
35. Meldman, supra note 10, at 42.

36.
37.
38.
39.
of only

Id.
Id. at 44.
Id.
Binary code is the basis of all computer programming. Binary code is comprised
two character types, the number "0," referred to as "off," and the number "1,"

referred to as "on." Computers respond to particular patterns of binary code, known as

"machine language," in ways unique to that pattern. Each digit of a binary number represents that corresponding power of the number "2"; for example, the corresponding powers
of 2 of a typical binary number are as follows:
Binary Number

10111

Corresponding Powers of 2
43210
The binary number 10111 simply means that 2 to the 4th power, 16, is "on," 2 to the 3rd
power, 8, is "off," 2 to the 2nd power, 4, is "on," 2 to the 1st power, 2, is "on," and 2 to the
0 power, 1, is "on." Thus, the binary number 10111 equals 16 + 4 + 2 + 1 = 23.
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Battery:
1. Intent
2. Contact
3. Consent
4. Privilege
5. Injury
6. Plate
7. Book
8. Rocketship
This is a small subset of the total set of attributes. The greater the
number of class attributes included in a classifier system, the more accurate the total system.
The expert's job is to identify those class attributes that are relevant. After class attributes are identified, the expert must incorporate a
classifier definition. Using the battery class attributes identified above,
a classifier system of battery might be defined as follows:
Battery:
A. 1, 2, 3
B. 4,5
C. 6, 7, 8
(NOTE: An underline indicates the negation of the attribute.)
A = those attributes which must be present;
B = those attributes whose absence would indicate negative evidence;
and
C = those attributes which are helpful when present but not damaging when absent.
Because microcomputers are able to compare bit attributes, 40 expert legal systems using legal concepts defined in the above manner
could be developed for microcomputers.
B.

LEARNING

Another question which often arises is whether computers are able
to "learn." Learning systems are able to extract knowledge from raw
data or through intersystem informative exchanges, including conversations with users. A learning system should be able to identify the facts
it does not already know, acquire this knowledge cumulatively, and incorporate the knowledge into its current knowledge structure. 4 1 If a
legal information system was able to learn, it could update itself and
thereby provide the user with the most current legal advice. This is the
last obstacle to creating the ideal expert legal system.
Generally, computers learn by translating specific instances into
40. See supra text accompanying notes 10-22.
41. Kolokouris, Machine Learning, BYTE, Nov. 1986, at 225.
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general rules. 42 "Martin's Law" stands for the proposition that one cannot learn anything unless one almost knows it already. 43 Professor
Winston demonstrates how a computer can learn class descriptions
from positive and negative samples. He calls this procedure "hit and
near miss."' 44 In this procedure, a teacher presents carefully chosen

samples. The computer "learns" whatever rules it can from the samples, and it then forgets the individual samples. The computer learns
through what Winston calls "induction heuristics"; that is, a model
evolves through known class attributes and non-attributes. Eventually,
the procedure forms general rules from specific instances.
VII.

A COMPUTER MODEL OF COMMON LAW LEGAL
REASONING

In recent years, researchers have attempted to model legal reason'45
ing using computers capable of exhibiting "artificial intelligence" that is, the capacity for "common sense," or the intelligent reasoning
which is generally characteristic of humans. 46 The failure of this approach led researchers to direct their attention toward the development
of teleozetic 47 expert systems capable of receiving factual input in
highly focused areas and applying the input to goals in the form of conditional statements. 48 These efforts have yielded expert legal systems
which incorporate the rules of a highly focused field of law, and which
ask the user about the user's specific fact situation. The system then
applies these facts to its endogenous rule hierarchy and offers a legal
solution. 49 Thus, modern expert legal systems offer users the opportunity to quickly and conveniently analyze the merits of a case, and to determine whether or how the case ought to proceed.
This progression of computer-modeled legal reasoning made it possible for the author of this article to develop a program entitled Com42. Id.
43. P. WINSTON, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 407 (1984).

44. Id. at 385.
45. See McCarty, Reflections on Taxman: An

Experiment in Artificial Intelligence

and Legal Reasoning, 90 HARV. L. REV. 837 (1977) (one of the first attempts to model legal
reasoning using artificial intelligence).
46. See Ciampi, Artificial Intelligence and Legal Information Systems, in ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE AND LEGAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS 49, 51 (C. Ciampi ed. 1982).
47. See Coulter, The Self-Determinism of Teleogenic Systems, 5 J. CYBERNETICS 9
(1976) (teleozetic systems are capable of receiving factual input, selecting among a set of
internally stored goals, and determining whether these goals have been satisfied).
48. Conditional statements are merely "if-then" rules; for example, "If I live in Pittsburgh, then I live in Pennsylvania" is a conditional statement. See infra text accompanying note 55.
49. See Popp & Schlink, JUDITH: A Computer Program to Advise Lawyers in Reasoning a Case, 15 JURIMETRICS J. 303 (1975); see also McCarty, supra note 45, at 837.
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puter Aided Criminal Trial Evidence Admissibility Heuristic
(CACTUS). 50 CACTUS enables the user to determine whether evidence obtained by either a police search or a confession to police may be
admitted against the defendant at a criminal trial. CACTUS prompts
the user for "yes" or "no" answers to a subset of its hierarchy of questions, and provides the user with a determination of whether a particular piece of evidence may be admitted at the defendant's trial. As each
question appears on the video display terminal, the user may choose to
answer the question with the letter "Y" or the letter "N," or, to learn
more about the legal principle underlying each question, the user could
input the letter "P." CACTUS is simple to use and understand and may
be employed by legal practitioners, judges, or curious laypersons, regardless of the user's level of computer expertise. 5 1
In order to construct an expert system for use within a particular
area of law, the legal principles underlying that area of law must be
transformed into computer source code-statements a computer can
recognize. The algorithm which constitutes CACTUS is a multi-level
hierarchy of conditional statements abstracted in an artificial intelli52
gence programming language called Prolog.
VIII.

THE PROLOG LANGUAGE

Prolog derives its name from the term "Programming in Logic."
Although all computer programming languages are a function of logic,
Prolog is relatively more powerful than other programming languages
because it closely emulates the logic of human thought and problemsolving processes.
Programming languages such as BASIC, Pascal, and "C" are procedural languages. A computer program written in one of these languages
consists of a kind of step-by-step recipe which tells the computer how to
solve the problem at hand. Prolog, by contrast, is a declarative language. A Prolog program provides the computer with a description of
the problem to be solved and lets the Prolog language, itself, supply the
procedural instructions.
A problem-solving component is inherent in every Prolog computer
program. The heart of the language is therefore an "inference engine"
which draws conclusions from facts which are not explicitly given in the
program itself. A Prolog program consists of statements of fact describing a problem and rules for dealing with such facts. For example, consider the following syllogism:
50. See infra app. A.
51. See infra text accompanying notes 56-72.
52. CACTUS was developed with the aid of TurboProlog which is a registered trademark of Borland International, Inc.

1989]

COMMON LAW REASONING
(1) All men are mortal.
(2) Socrates is a man.
53
(3) Socrates is mortal.

A Prolog program facing this problem would convey facts (1) and (2),
and the computer would derive conclusion (3) with the aid of the Prolog
language.5
Of course, facts (1) and (2) must be presented to the computer in
syntactically correct source code. CACTUS' source code consists of
many such syntactically correct rules of fact. In order to understand
CACTUS' source code, Prolog should be conceptualized by translating
the language into rules of predicate logic. Thus, an explanation of predicate logic is in order.
IX.

PREDICATE LOGIC

Predicate logic is particularly useful for translating natural language principles into computer source code. 55 The rules contained in
CACTUS are readily constructed into natural language statements.
Predicate logic incorporates the rules of inference of traditional logic,
and thereby allows new consequences to be derived from antecedents.
These rules of inference are common to most modern expert legal systems and are inherent to CACTUS as well.
The operation of predicate logic is largely dependent upon language
symbols and rules which govern their use, commonly known as "syntax." In this respect, the syntax of predicate logic is similar to the syntax of arithmetic and mathematics. Predicate logic is also composed of
connectives that logically relate syntactically valid statements.
For the purpose of interpreting CACTUS and other similar expert
legal systems, only a cursory understanding of predicate logic is required. All predicates are presumed to be syntactically valid in CACTUS' source code.
The most basic rules of inference are expressed in the following
"truth-table" analysis of predicate logic.
53. See supra text accompanying notes 10-22.
54. See Shafer, Prolog - Just the Beginning, MACUSER, Mar. 1987, at 122-26.
55. See generally I. CoPi, supra note 5 (a general discussion of logic).

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. IX

PREDICATE LOGIC TRUTH-TABLE
P
T
T
F
F

Q
T
F
T
F

-P
F
F
T
T

-Q

P&Q
T
F
F
F

F
T
F
T

-P&Q
F
F
T
F

PVQ
T
T
T
F

P=>Q
T
F
T
T

P= >-Q
F
T
T
T

In the truth-table above, the letters "P" and "Q" represent syntactically
valid predicate logic statements. For example, "P" may represent the
statement "I live in Pittsburgh." Similarly, "Q" may represent the statement "I live in Pennsylvania." The truth values of either P or Q may be
represented as true,"T," or false, "F."
The logical connectives used in the above truth-table are interpreted as follows:
LOGICAL CONNECTIVES
CONNECTIVE
&
V

"

- > "Conditional

INTERPRETATION
Negation ("Not")
Conjunction ("And")
Disjunction ("Or")

("If-Then")

The statement "-P" means "It is not the case that I live in Pittsburgh,"
or, more simply, "I do not live in Pittsburgh." Similarly, "-Q" means
"I do not live in Pennsylvania." "P & Q" means "I live in Pittsburgh
and I live in Pennsylvania." "-P & Q" means "I do not live in Pittsburgh, but/and I live in Pennsylvania." "P V Q" means "I live in Pittsburgh or I live in Pennsylvania." "P => Q" means "If I live in
Pittsburgh, then I live in Pennsylvania." And finally, "P => -Q"
means "If I live in Pittsburgh, then I do not live in Pennsylvania."
The truth value of each of the last seven complex statements,
namely -P, -Q, P & Q, and so on, is a function of the truth values of
the first two atomic predicates, P and Q. For example, looking across
the first row in the truth-table above, notice that because P and Q are
both true, "T," then -P is false, "F," -Q is false, P & Q is true, -P &
Q is false, P V Q is true, P = > Q is true, and P = > -Q is false. Likewise, the truth values of the last seven complex predicates in the three
remaining rows in the truth-table are also functions of the truth values
of the first two atomic predicates.
These predicates may also represent other natural language statements such as legal principles. For example, the predicate "Q" may
represent the statement "Defendant is guilty of battery." The predicate
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"P" may represent the statement "Defendant touched Complainant."
Similarly, in order to represent the remaining elements of battery, the
predicate "L" may represent "Defendant intended to touch, or was substantially certain that he was likely to touch, Complainant." "M" may
represent "Defendant's touching of Complainant was offensive," and
"N" may represent "Complainant suffered an injury caused by Defendant's touching."
The complex predicate for battery, as defined here, would be represented as "(L & M & N & P) = > Q"; in other words, if the elements L,
M, N, and P are all satisfied, then the antecedent (L & M & N & P) is
true, and Q is a true statement as well. If one or more of the predicates
L, M, N, and P are false, then the antecedent (L & M & N & P) must be
false, and the consequence, Q, must also be false. Thus, in order for Defendant to be guilty of battery-that is, in order to establish that "Q" is
true-the prosecutor must establish at Defendant's criminal trial that
all of the elements of battery, as they are represented by the symbols L,
M, N, and P, are true.
This type of logic is inherent in the CACTUS expert legal system
and is represented by Prolog's unique syntax and connectives. As mentioned above, CACTUS is designed to determine whether a particular
piece of evidence, gained either through a police search or by a confession to police, may be admitted at Defendant's criminal trial. The structure of CACTUS is a hierarchy of interrelated, complex predicate
clauses which are either satisfied or "failed" in accordance with the
user's response to a subset of CACTUS' hierarchy of questions. CACTUS interprets the user's responses and makes a determination as to
the admissibility of evidence based on the rules of inference characteristic of predicate logic.
X.

AN APPLICATION OF PREDICATE LOGIC TO LEGAL
REASONING: CACTUS
A- THE STRUCTURE OF CACTUS

CACTUS' source code was developed using the artificial intelligence programming language Prolog and is divided into standard Prolog
sections. 56 These sections include an untitled section at the very top of
the program containing the system commands-"nowarnings" and
"code = 3000." 5 7 These commands relate more to the interaction between the program and the computer than to the interaction between
the user and the program. An understanding of these commands is important only to the Prolog programmer.
56. See infra app. A.
57. Id, lines 80, 90.
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The Prolog "database" section contains several elements including
"question(string)". 58 These database elements are dynamic facts; for
example, a limitless number of "strings" may be assigned to the element "question(string)" as long as the assignment is made in proper
TurboProlog syntax. Once a particular value is assigned to a database
element, for example, "question(Case)," 59 that value will remain an asserted fact throughout the program. Note that there may be two or
more permanent assignments to a particular database element throughout the program, for example, "question(X). ' 60 These asserted facts
may then be used within the program's hierarchy.
The "predicates" section 6 1 of CACTUS contains the terms "admis,"
"inadmis," and so on. These terms are similar in form and function to
standard predicates used in predicate logic. 62 These predicates are in-

corporated into clauses 63 which are similar to predicate logic
statements.
The "goal" section of CACTUS 64 is the starting point of the Prolog
search process; the goal identifies the initial consequent-predicate.
CACTUS' initial consequent-predicate is "inadmis;admis." The semi-colon which appears in CACTUS' goal is a disjunctive logical connectiveit represents "or." Therefore, Prolog will attempt to satisfy CACTUS'
goal by satisfying "inadmis" or, if "inadmis" fails, by satisfying "admis."
In the "inadmis" portion of CACTUS' goal, Prolog will determine
whether the predicate "inadmis" is satisfied by looking throughout the
"clauses" section of the source code 65 in order to find the first clause
where "inadmis" appears as the consequent. The first clause which contains "inadmis" as its consequent 66 is represented as "inadmis if hello,
confession-standing, not(valid--confession) . . . ." The "if" which follows "inadmis" is logically identical to the symbol "< =" as it is used in
predicate logic. 67 The statements "hello," "confession-standing,"

"not(valid-confession),"68 and "not(fruit-poisonous-tree)," are predicates established by the programmer in the "predicates" section. The
58. Id., lines 210-40.

59. Id., lines 2420-80.
60. Id., line 2530.
Id., lines 340-1700.
See supra text accompanying note 55.
See infra app. A, lines 1980-16210.
Id., lines 1830-50.
Id., lines 1980-16210.
Id., line 2130.
." Where the
67. The logical connective "< =" is merely the logical converse of
predicate statement "P = > Q" means "If I live in Pittsburgh, then I live in Pennsylvania," "Q < = P" is logically identical insofar as it means "I live in Pennsylvania if I
live in Pittsburgh." See supra sec. IX, "Logical Connectives" Table.
68. The statement not (valid---confession) is merely the negation of the predicate
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
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remaining statements within the antecedent are "built-in" predicates
which are automatically executed, and, therefore, "satisfied," by Prolog.
In order to determine whether "inadmis" is satisfied, Prolog must determine whether each of the programmer-defined predicates within the
clause are satisfied. Prolog will first determine whether the programmer-defined predicate "hello" is satisfied by looking at the first clause
which features "hello" as its consequent-that is, to the left of "if." The
clause which features "hello" as its consequent 69 is entirely composed of
"built-in" Prolog predicates. Once the computer has automatically performed these functions, the predicate "hello" is satisfied.
Similarly, Prolog will determine whether "confession-standing" is
satisfied by looking to the first clause where it appears as the consequent. 70 Prolog will automatically satisfy built-in predicates and determine whether programmer-defined predicates such as "clearbase" and
"affirm" are satisfied, by using the same method of finding the clause
where each programmer-defined predicate appears as the consequent.
This process continues until Prolog reaches the point where all built-in
predicates have been automatically satisfied, and there are no programmer-defined predicates which have not been either satisfied or failed.
Prolog will, thereby, have satisfied one of the two disjuncts of CACTUS' goal, "inadmis" or "admis," and the user will be provided with a
response to the inquiry.
CACTUS was written in a manner which requires no computer expertise on the part of the user. Thus, CACTUS is "user friendly." To
start CACTUS, the user need only type "CACTUS" into the computer.
CACTUS will automatically respond with a subset of its total set of
commands and questions. 71 The user must respond to these questions
with a single letter: either "Y" for yes, "N" for no, or "P" for the underlying legal principle. By responding to a question with the letter "P,"
the user will be able to read about the particular legal principle underlying the instant question. 72 The name of the case in which each principle is promulgated is provided as well. Thus, CACTUS enables students
to appreciate the status of the law of searches and confessions as it
stood in 1985, and it enables legal practitioners to structure a relatively
complete, logical argument.
CACTUS does not allow the user to "speak" to the computer using
"natural language"-that is, by way of complete or partial English
sentences. LEXIS and WestLaw are two of only a very few law-related
(valid--confession) and, thus, it operates identically with the predicate logic connective

."
69. See
70. See
71. See
72. See

infra app. A, line 2660.
id., line 8260.
infra app. B.
id., panels 5, 11.
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computer programs or systems which allow the user to input messages
which are relatively similar to the spoken or written English language.
This deficiency in CACTUS was intentional. Natural language
computer programs are difficult, time-consuming, and expensive to create. CACTUS, on the other hand, was created by the author of this article, during a nine-month period, for the sole purpose of modeling the
deductive analysis which composes an important part of the process of
legal reasoning.
However, one should note that because legal reasoning involves
both deductive and inductive reasoning, CACTUS does not accurately
reflect the complete process of legal reasoning.
CACTUS is one of the first law-related computer programs which
uses the artificial intelligence capabilities of Prolog. It was created to
provide insight into the relationship between artificial intelligence and
legal reasoning and to enable expert legal systems developers to more
fully utilize Prolog's natural language and learning potential.
B.

USING CACTUS TO DETERMINE THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE

Appendix B contains the sequential print-out of a typical execution
of CACTUS. This particular execution was based upon the following
fact scenario.
John Doe was released from a prison for the criminally insane in
February of 1987. Doe had been convicted on two counts of arson and
incarcerated for two years based on these convictions. The prosecutor
proved that Doe, acting alone, set fire to two of his Gotham City neighbors' homes for no apparent reason other than his general dislike for
these neighbors. As a result, Doe was diagnosed as insane under standard psychiatric principles.
During April and May of 1987, a series of unusual fires erupted in
Gotham City in homes and buildings immediately adjacent to where
Doe lived prior to his incarceration. Police investigators recognized similarities between these new fires and those for which Doe had been convicted. Consequently, in June of 1987, Doe's activities became the
subject of constant undercover police surveillance.
Early in the course of their investigation of Doe, undercover police
detectives learned that Doe was living with his girlfriend, Jane Elk, a
suspected low level drug courier for an organized crime ring in Gotham
City. The police also learned that there were two outstanding warrants
for Elk's arrest. The police decided to postpone Elk's arrest until they
had enough evidence to arrest Doe as well. For this reason, copies of
Elk's arrest warrants were provided to the investigation teams who
were assigned the task of observing Doe.
During the early morning hours of June 11, 1987, Doe was observed
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by Gotham City Police Department detectives, Wolf and Hunt, driving
from Elk's apartment complex. The detectives followed Doe in an unmarked police car to a gasoline station several blocks from Elk's apartment. Doe purchased several one-gallon containers of kerosene from
the gasoline station attendant, and put the canisters in the trunk of his
car. Doe then drove to the home of one of his former neighbors.
Wolf and Hunt followed Doe as he turned off his car lights and
rolled to a stop in the driveway of a darkened home. Doe exited the
car, removed the kerosene canisters from its trunk, and walked toward
the house. As Doe was opening one of the kerosene canisters, a member of the household awoke and turned on the front floodlights. Doe
ran and jumped into his car, then sped away from the residence. The
police detectives, believing that they had just observed an attempted arson, put their removable "Kojak" police light on the roof of their
cruiser and pursued Doe in a high-speed chase.
Wolf and Hunt lost Doe during their pursuit. The detectives then
proceeded to Elk's apartment complex in the hope that Doe would return there. Within fifteen minutes, Doe returned to the apartment
complex, pounding his fist and shouting obscenities. The detectives surreptitiously followed Doe as he entered the complex and proceeded to
Elk's apartment.
After a few minutes, Wolf and Hunt broke down Elk's apartment
door. Inside they found Doe and Elk sitting at the kitchen table "snorting" some of Elk's cocaine. The officers arrested Doe, confiscated the
cocaine he had been snorting, and impounded his car. The officers also
arrested Elk pursuant to the outstanding arrest warrants against her.
The detectives did not search Doe's or Elk's persons or possessions any
further.
The question now is whether evidence obtained by the detectives
during their "raid" on Elk's apartment will be admissible in a criminal
trial. As illustrated by Appendix B, the focus will be exclusively on
whether the cocaine may be admitted at Doe's trial.
As indicated above, in order to execute the program the user need
only type the word "CACTUS" into the computer. The computer will
respond by displaying a window which introduces and explains the use
of CACTUS. 73 The user must then hit any key.
CACTUS will ask the user: "Is the instant evidence the result of a
confession by Defendant to the police?" 74 The above facts do not reveal
any information about a confession by Doe to police. Therefore, the answer to this question must be "N" for "no."
CACTUS will then ask the user: "Was the Defendant the target of
73. See id., panel 1.
74. See id., panel 2.
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a search by the police? ' 75 Even though it appears that the cocaine was
owned by Elk, Doe was using it when the police confiscated it, so Doe
was, in a sense, searched. Therefore, the answer to this question must
be "Y" for "yes."
CACTUS continues by asking the user: "Did Defendant have a legitimate expectation of privacy in his own property which was the subject of a search? '7 6 If the user feels that the term "legitimate
expectation of privacy" is unclear, the letter "P" for "principle," should
be typed to access the legal principle underlying each question, and
77
thereby gain more insight into what CACTUS is asking.
After accessing the underlying legal principle, CACTUS will return
to the previously unanswered question. Because, in this case, Doe did
not own the cocaine, he did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy
'7 8
in it. Therefore, the answer to this question must be "N."
Since the privacy expectation may be applied to objects which are
owned by another person, CACTUS will then respond by asking the
user: "Did Defendant have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
property of another which was the subject of a search?" 79 It is clear
that Doe will want to keep the cocaine from being entered into evidence. Therefore, he will argue that he did have a legitimate expectation of privacy relating to Elk's cocaine. Therefore, the answer to this
question should be "Y."
CACTUS will respond by asking the user: "Can it be said that Defendant's expectation of privacy in his own, or another's, property is socially worthy?"8 0 Although cocaine consumption is both illegal and
immoral, the answer to this question should probably be "Y." Where
one has a legitimate expectation of privacy in another person's property,
that expectation should be regarded as socially worthy unless and until
it can be shown that the underlying property is illegal in nature. Otherwise, the careful and fair nature of our judicial process would be
compromised.
CACTUS continues by asking the user: "Did the police obtain a
search warrant before they conducted the search?" 8' At the time of the
search, the detectives had only Elk's arrest warrants in their possession.
Thus, they confiscated the cocaine without a search warrant. Therefore, the answer to this question should be "N."
CACTUS will then ask the user: "Did Defendant have a dangerous
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

See id.,
See id.,
See id.,
See id.,
See id.,
See id.,
See id.,

panel
panel
panel
panel
panel
panel
panel

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
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weapon within his immediate control, and did the search occur contemporaneously with Defendant's arrest?18 2 It is unclear whether the kerosene was a "dangerous weapon," and whether it was within Doe's
"immediate control." Again, if the user types "P," CACTUS will display the legal definitions of these terms. However, the underlying legal
principle is only tangentially on point.83 Kerosene is not, in itself, a
dangerous weapon. Nor was the kerosene in Doe's automobile trunk
within his immediate control. Therefore, the answer to this question
should be "N."

'8 4

CACTUS will respond by asking the following two questions: "Did
the arresting officers make a search of Defendant's residence while accompanying Defendant in order to monitor his movements?" and "Did
the arresting officers make a search of Defendant's person due to a rea85
sonably held belief that Defendant was carrying a concealed weapon?"
According to the facts, the answers to these questions should be "N."
CACTUS will continue by asking the user: "Were there others
present at the site of Defendant's arrest who might have destroyed evidence while the arresting officers would otherwise have left to obtain a
search warrant? '8 6 Arguably, because officers Wolf and Hunt arrested
both Doe and Elk together, there was no one at Elk's apartment who
could have destroyed the cocaine if it had been left there pending a
search warrant. However, it was at the officers' discretion whether to
arrest Elk with Doe. They could have left Elk behind and taken the cocaine without a search warrant. In order to save time and effort, they
merely consolidated tasks which were within their legal power to perform. Therefore, the answer to this question should be "Y."
CACTUS will then ask the user: "Did the officers arrest Defendant while both Defendant and the officers were in hot pursuit from the
scene of Defendant's alleged crime? '8 7 This question should be answered negatively for several reasons. First, it is unclear whether attempted arson is a crime. Second, it is unclear whether Doe actually
attempted arson. Finally, Doe was not arrested while Wolf and Hunt
were in hot pursuit.
CACTUS will respond by asking the user: "Did Defendant pose a
threat of injury to himself or to others? '8 8 Doe clearly intended to
cause some harm to the residents of the home from which he fled. The
fact that he had been incarcerated in a prison for the criminally insane
82. See id., panel 10.
83. See id., panel 11.
84. See id., panel 12.
85. See id., panels 13-14.

86. See id., panel 15.
87. See id., panel 16.
88. See id., panel 17.
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for arson convictions supports this intent. Therefore, the answer to this
question should be "Y."
CACTUS will continue by asking the user: "Were the arresting officers providing assistance to victims of Defendant's alleged crime when
they discovered the evidence in question?"8 9 The facts suggest that the
answer to this question should be "N."
CACTUS will then ask the user: "Was a home searched without a
warrant during the course of Defendant's arrest for a crime other than
a routine felony?" 90 Because officers Wolf and Hunt should know the
law, and conducted their search without a search warrant, it may be
surmised that arson may not be a "routine felony." Therefore, the answer to this question should be "Y."
In brief, the questions which appear in Panels 20 through 36 should
be answered in the negative. 9' That is, given the facts as set out above,
the user should respond to each question with the letter "N."
In Panel 37, CACTUS will ask the user: "If the police conducted an
illegal search or obtained an illegal confession, was the same evidence
discovered or discoverable through an independent source?" 92 Because
the police had outstanding warrants against Elk, they could have arrested her in the apartment at any time during the surveillance of Doe.
While arresting Elk, the officers would be allowed to take any evidence
in plain view. Doe was snorting the cocaine within plain view of Wolf
and Hunt. Therefore, if they had been at Elk's apartment for the sole
purpose of arresting Elk, they would have been able to confiscate the
cocaine.
Furthermore, there was nothing illegal in the way Wolf and Hunt
conducted their search. Although they did not have a search warrant
when they confiscated the cocaine, they lawfully entered Elk's apartment in order to arrest Doe. Once inside the apartment, the detectives
contemporaneously confiscated the cocaine that was in plain view.
Therefore, the answer to this question should be "Y."
Finally, CACTUS will generate for the user its determination: The
93
evidence is admissible at Doe's trial.
This same analysis should be followed for each piece of evidence to
be presented at trial. CACTUS will respond with a different subset of
questions according to the user's answers.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

See
See
See
See
See

id.,
id.,
id.,
id.,
id,

panel 18.
panel 19.
panels 20-36.
panel 37.
panel 38.
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XI.

THE VALUE OF EXPERT LEGAL SYSTEMS

There are four distinct issues to consider when analyzing the value
of expert legal systems. The first is whether expert legal systems are
useful to legal practitioners in their day-to-day research. The second is
whether expert legal systems have any practical value for laypersons.
The third is whether expert legal systems have any predictive value
with regard to future court decisions. Finally, while expert legal systems may be useful from an objective point of view, it is important to
examine whether they may have subjective monetary value to practitioners and laypersons. In other words, will users think the benefits
justify the costs?
A.

THE UTILITY OF EXPERT LEGAL SYSTEMS WITH REGARD TO
LEGAL RESEARCH

There are two general types of expert systems: "top-down" or
"backward-chaining" systems, and "bottom-up" or "forward-chaining"
systems. 94 Top-down programs begin with a single question or a small,
well defined set of questions. Depending upon the user's responses to
these questions, the program proceeds down a "root-like" structure to
other logically related questions or sets of questions until it reaches the
bottom point of a particular "root."
Bottom-up expert systems, on the other hand, begin at the bottom
of the root-like hierarchical structure and ask the user about every issue at the bottom of the root structure. Depending upon the user's responses to this set of questions, the program proceeds up the root-like
structure until it reaches the top.
Both types of expert systems are of value to the legal practitioner.
They provide information regarding the legal principles underlying certain fact situations. However, top-down programs, such as CACTUS,
are of less research value to the legal practitioner than bottom-up programs. This is true because the former restricts the user's access to information regarding legal principles to just one branch of the root-like
structure. Top-down programs presume that the user has a broad base
of legal knowledge, or that he will be satisfied with a narrow argument.
Bottom-up programs, on the other hand, inform the user about a wide
variety of legal principles underlying a particular set of facts, thereby
enabling him to construct broad, deep arguments and alternative arguments. Bottom-up programs are more time consuming to use, but less
time consuming to create.
Furthermore, top-down programs more accurately model human
legal reasoning. In a pure sense, legal reasoning involves the applica94. See Frey, A Bit-Mapped C7assifier, BYTE, Nov. 1986, at 161.
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tion of facts to a set of legal principles. 95 Legal practitioners begin with
a set of facts, apply these facts to threshold questions and questions regarding prima facie elements and defenses, and derive a conclusion
therefrom. Arguably, this method is subscribed to only by judges and
legal scholars, and not by practicing attorneys. 96 Similarly, top-down
programs query the user for facts and apply these facts to internal
threshold questions and questions relating to elements and defenses.
CACTUS could have been written either as a top-down or bottomup program. However, CACTUS was written as a top-down program in
order to model legal reasoning as accurately as possible. Although, topdown programs are not ideal for research purposes, they are useful
tools for discovering the means by which legal practitioners reason.

B.

THE UTILITY OF EXPERT LEGAL SYSTEMS WITH REGARD TO THE
NEEDS OF LAYPERSONS

While a top-down expert system may not be very valuable to the
legal practitioner, it may be quite valuable to the inexperienced layperson who seeks legal guidance. If a layperson is involved in a legal proceeding, and seeks legal guidance from an expert legal system, he will
generally do so in order to competently represent himself in a relatively
minor matter, or to determine whether to seek the assistance of an attorney. If by using a top-down expert system, the layperson derives the
answer he desires, the layperson will know instantly how to proceed
with his case because the system enables the user to construct a welldefined argument. Alternatively, if the top-down system arrives at a
conclusion contrary to his wishes, the layperson can then choose between forgetting the matter, resolving the matter extra-judicially, or
seeking the guidance of an attorney.
C.

THE PREDICTIVE VALUE OF EXPERT LEGAL SYSTEMS WITH REGARD
TO COURT DECISIONS

The estimate a legal expert will give regarding the predictive value
of expert legal systems will turn on whether the expert is a legal positivist or a legal realist. Legal positivists maintain that moral judgments
about the goodness or badness of human laws cannot be established by
97
reasoning, but are merely expressions of human feelings or choices.
One can predict future court decisions by identifying collective social
values and deriving conclusions from them.
Legal realists, on the other hand, maintain that legal certainty is
95. See supra text accompanying notes 23-26.
96. See infra text accompanying notes 97-98.
97. See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
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rarely attainable, and perhaps, undesirable, in a changing society. 98
Legal realists posit that predictions with regard to future court decisions cannot be had in any accurate form.
The same philosophical distinction is vital to determine whether
expert legal systems have any predictive value with regard to future
court decisions. Legal positivists would maintain that, as long as the
collective social conscience can be ascertained, it can be transformed
into an expert legal system, and an accurate forecast of court decisions
can be made. Legal realists would maintain the opposite position: since
no man can predict court decisions with a high degree of certainty, a
computer is also incapable of doing so because it is merely a function of
the former.
The legal realist philosophy is more appealing because it recognizes
that predictions of court decisions must take into account a myriad of
values for a myriad of variables. Such a task is beyond the realm of
human capability, and computers are therefore also precluded from accomplishing this goal. Thus, while expert legal systems may have some
research value to the practitioner and layperson, they are poor barometers for court decisions with regard to particular cases.
D.

A FORECAST OF THE ACCEPTANCE OF EXPERT LEGAL SYSTEMS BY
PRACTITIONERS AND LAYPERSONS

Expert legal systems appear to have some theoretical value to practitioners and laypersons. However, such systems must have commercial
value as well in order to inspire private industry to further develop and
refine them. In this regard, expert legal systems may be useful for
practitioners to screen out spurious cases, and to expedite the research
process underlying clients' cases. Expert systems may also execute ancillary, mechanical tasks which occupy large portions of an attorney's
limited time.
An expert system, or a set of such systems, which is capable of
resolving many of the practitioner's problems would be invaluable.
Given the recent increase in the number of people practicing law, attorneys must become more efficient, and perhaps, must lower their fees in
order to compete. Although there is neither an integrated expert system, nor a set of expert systems which can tackle all of the attorney's
mundane tasks, apparently such systems do indeed have commercial
value because the trend in legal software development is toward this
goal.
98. See D. BURTON, supra note 3; K. LLEWELYN, supra note 3; J. FRANK, supra note 3;
D. MACCORMICK, supra note 3.
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APPENDIX A
CACTUS SOURCE CODE
10

/*

20

30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
160
170
180
190
200
210
220
230

=

COMMENT =

THE FOLLOWING COMMANDS RELATE TO THE INTERACTION
OF THE CACTUS PROGRAM WITH THE PROLOG SYSTEM.

*/
nowarnings
code=2000

/*
- COMMENT

=

THE FOLLOWING DATABASE FUNCTIONS ARE VARIABLE IN THE
SENSE THAT DIFFERENT VALUES ARE ATTRIBUTED - I.E.,
"INSTANTIATED" - TO EACH OF THE "STRING" AND "CHAR"
VARIABLES THROUGHOUT CACTUS, AND THE INSTANTIATED
COMMANDS ARE USED FOR VARIOUS SUBROUTINES.

*/
database
question(string)
explanation(string,string)

240

answer(string,char)

250
260

/*

270

280
290
300

310
320
330
340

- COMMENT
THE FOLLOWING PREDICATES IDENTIFY TO THE COMPUTER THE
VARIOUS CLAUSE FUNCTIONS IT WILL ENCOUNTER AS IT
PROCESSES THE HIERARCHICAL LOGIC STRUCTURE OF CACTUS

predicates

350
360
370
380
390
400
410
420

admis
inadmis
search-standing
confession-standing
valid-search
valid-confession
target
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430
440
450
460
470
480
490
500
510
520
530
540
550
560
570
580
590
600
610
620
630
640
650
660
670
680
690
700
710
720
730
740
750
760
770
780
790
800
810
820
830
840
850
860
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expect-privacy
socially-worthy
plain-view
open-field
dog-sniff
warrant-exception
search-incident-arrest
exigent--circumstances
home-arrest
automobile-scope
inventory-search
stop-frisk
administrative-search
consent-search
immediate-control
dorm-room
probable-cause-weapon
destroy-evidence
hot-pursuit
threat-injury
assistance-victims
non-routine-felony
gravity-crime
defendant-home
mobile-vehicle
seizable--items
custodial-arrest
scope-inventory-search
incarcerated-inventory-search
carrying-weapon
informant-stop-frisk
drug-courier
illegal-aliens
specific-articulable
car-stop--frisk
finger-printing
seizure-apartment
health-inspection
school-inspection
liquor-inspection
defendant-voluntary-consent
third-party-consent
right-refuse
subtle-coercion
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870
880
890
900
910
920
930
940
950
960
970
980
990
1000
1010
1020
1030
1040
1050
1060
1070
1080
1090
1100
1110
1120
1130
1140
1150
1160
1170
1180
1190
1200
1210
1220
1230
1240
1250
1260
1270
1280
1290
1300

defendant-custody
intimidating-environment
inferior-intelligence
police-contact
vulnerable-state-mind
limit-consent
power-authority
possessory-interest
defendant-agent
assumed-risk
apparent-authority
search-warrant
basis-knowledge
informant-veracious
corroborated-facts
self-verifying
good-faith-exception
misleading-affidavit
rubber-stamp-magistrate
inadequate-affidavit
facially-deficient
voluntary-confession
miranda-rights
totality-circumstances
abusive-method
poor-condition
police-force
independent-proof
unnecessary-delay
judge-unavailable
testimony-conflicts
not-custody
general-cooperation
car-briefly-stopped
not-stationhouse
not-police-car
not-own-home
person-briefly-stopped
not-interrogated
voluntary-statement
indirect-questions
unlikely-elicit-response
public-safety-exception
waived-miranda-rights
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1310
1320
1330

knowingly-intelligently
implied-waiver
with-legal-counsel

1340
1350
1360
1370
1380

not-initiated-proceedings
not-suspicion-focused
unaccusatory--questions
not-interrogation-restarted
miranda-again

1390
1400

unrelated-crime
defendant-communicated

1410
1420
1430
1440
1450
1460
1470
1480
1490
1500
1510
1520
1530
1540
1550
1560
1570
1580
1590
1600
1610
1620
1630
1640
1650
1660
1670
1680
1690
1700

street-questioned
fruit-poisonous-tree
independent-source
inevitable-discovery
attenuated-chain
surveillance
hello
type-crime
confession-conditions
defendant-property
third-party-property
affirm
clearbase
help
clearanswer
go-on
whose-property
warrant-used
filler1
filler2
filler3
filler4
filler5
filler6
filler7
filler8
filler9
fillerl0
fillerll
fillerl2
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1710
1720

1730
= COMMENT =
1740
1750
THE FOLLOWING GOAL INDICATES THE STARTING POINT
1760
FOR THE COMPUTER'S ANALYSIS OF THE CLAUSES IN
1770
CACTUS. THAT IS, THE COMPUTER WILL FIRST DETERMINE
1780
WHETHER THE "INADMIS" CLAUSES IS SATISFIED. IF IT
1790
FAILS, THEN THE COMPUTER WILL DETERMINE WHETHER
1800
THE "ADMIS" CLAUSE IS SATISFIED.
1810-*/
1820
1830
goal
1840
1850
inadmis;admis.
1860
1870

/*

1880
= COMMENT =
1890
1900
THE FOLLOWING CLAUSES COMPRISE THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE
1910
OF CACTUS. SOME CLAUSES DEFINE MESSAGES OR
1920
QUESTIONS WHICH WILL BE POSED TO THE USER. THE
1930
REMAINING CLAUSES DEFINE THE LOGICAL RELATIONSHIP
1940
BETWEEN CLAUSES, THEREBY CREATING THE LOGICAL
1950
HIERARCHY OF CACTUS.
1960-*/
1970
1980
clauses
1990
2000
/*
2010
= COMMENT =
2020
2030
THE FOLLOWING "INADMIS" AND "ADMIS" CLAUSES ARE
2040
ALTERNATIVE CLAUSES WHICH OCCUPY A PARALLEL LEVEL
2050
IN THE CACTUS STRUCTURE, JUST BELOW THE TOP "GOAL"
2060
LEVEL. IF THE FIRST "INADMIS" CLAUSE FAILS, THEN
2070
THE COMPUTER WILL ATTEMPT TO SATISFY THE SECOND
2080
"INDAMIS" CLAUSE. IF THAT FAILS AS WELL, THEN THE
2090
"ADMIS" CLAUSE WILL AUTOMATICALLY BE SATISFIED BY
2100
DEFAULT.
2110-*/
2120
2130
2140

inadmis if hello,confession-standing,not(valid-confession),
not(fruit-poisonous-tree),clearwindow,nl,
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2150
2160
2170
2180
2190
2200
2210
2220
2230
2240
2250
2260
2270
2280
2290
2300
2310
2320
2330
2340
2350
2360

2370
2380
2390

makewindow(4,15,9,"CACTUS
DETERMINATION",0,0,25,80),
cursor(12,15),write("The evidence is INADMISSIBLE at
defendant's trial."),makewindow(2,139,9,"",20,0,5,80),
cursor(2,35),write("HIT ANY KEY"),readchar(X),
removewindow,removewindow.
inadmis if search-standing,not(valid-search),
not(fruit-poisonous--tree),clearwindow,
nl,makewindow(4,15,9,"CACTUS
DETERMINATION",0,0,25,80),
cursor(12,15),write("The evidence is INADMISSIBLE
at Defendant's trial."),makewindow(2,139,9,'",20,0,5,80),
cursor(2,35),write("HIT ANY KEY"),readchar(X),
removewindow,removewindow.
admis if clearwindow,nl,makewindow(4,15,9,"CACTUS
DETERMINATION,0,0,25,80),cursor(12,15),
write("The evidence is ADMISSIBLE at Defendant's
trial."),makewindow(2,139,9,"",20,0,5,80),
cursor(2,35),write("HIT ANY KEY"),readchar(X),
removewindow,removewindow.
/*
-

COMMENT

=

THE FOLLOWING CLAUSES ARE ESSENTIALLY SUBROUTINES.

2400

2410
2420
2430
2440
2450

--

affirm if question(Case),readchar(Answer),
asserta(answer(Case,Answer)),answer(Case,'Y');
answer(Case,'y');question(Case),answer(Case,'P'),help;
question(Case),answer(Case,'p'),help.

2460
2470
2480
2490
2500
2510
2520
2530
2540
2550
2560

help if makewindow(2,15,15,"CACTUS PRINCIPLE",1,0,9,80),
question(Case),explanation(Case,Phrase),
write(Phrase),cursor(6,35),write("HIT ANY KEY"),
clearanswer,readchar(X),removewindow,affirm.
clearbase if answer(X,Y),retract(answer(X,Y)),fail;
question(X),retract(question(X)),fail;clearwindow.
clearanswer if answer(X,Y),retract(answer(X,Y)),fail;go-on.

*/
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2570
2580

go-on.

2590

/*
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2600
- COMMENT =
2610
2620
THE "HELLO" CLAUSE IS THE FIRST WINDOW THE USER
2630
WILL SEE WHEN HE RUNS THE CACTUS PROGRAM.
2640-*/
2650
2660
hello if clearwindow,nl,
2670
makewindow(1,15,9,"CACTUS",0,0,25,80),
2680
cursor(5,36),write ("HELLO."),
2690
cursor(8,30),write("Welcome to CACTUS, the"),
2700
cursor(11,10),write("Computer Aided Criminal Trial
2710
Evidence Admissibility Heuristic"),
2720
cursor(12,10),write("This program will enable the user to
2730
determine whether evidence"),
2740
2750
2760
2770
2780
2790
2800
2810
2820
2830
2840

cursor(13,10),write("obtained either by a search or
confession may be admitted at a"),
cursor(14,30),write("criminal trial."),
cursor(17,20),write("NOTE: Where a letter response is
requested by CACTUS,"),
cursor(18,22),write("respond with only a single letter:
'Y', 'N', or 'P."),
cursor(22,35),write(" < HIT ANY KEY > "),readchar(X).
/*
= COMMENT

-

2850

2860
2870

THE FOLLOWING CLAUSES DEAL WITH ISSUES WHICH RELATE
TO EVIDENCE GATHERED THROUGH A SEARCH BY POLICE.

2880-*/
2890
2900
search-standing if target,expect-privacy.
2910
2920
target if clearbase,asserta(question(targetl)),
2930
clearwindow,cursor(10,10),write("Is the instant evidence
2940
the result of a search"),
2950
cursor(11,10),write("by police?"),
2960
cursor(20,35),write("<Y> or <N>"),
2970
affirm.
2980
2990
expect-privacy if whose-property,socially-worthy.
3000
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3010
3020
3030
3040
3050
3060
3070
3080
3090
3100
3110
3120
3130
3140
3150
3160
3170
3180
3190
3200
3210
3220
3230
3240
3250
3260
3270
3280
3290
3300
3310
3320
3330
3340
3350
3360
3370
3380
3390
3400
3410
3420
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whose-property if defendant-property;third-partyproperty.
defendant-property if clearbase,
asserta(question(rawlingsl)),clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Did Defendant have a legitimate
expectation of privacy"),
cursor(11,10),write("in his own property which was the
subject of a search?"),
cursor(20,30),write("<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple"),affirm.
third-party--property if clearbase,
asserta(question(rawlings2)),clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Did Defendant have a legitimate
expectation of privacy"),
cursor(11,10),write("in the property of another which was
the subject"),
cursor(12,10),write("of a search?"),
cursor(20,30),write("<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple"),affirm.
socially-worthy if clearbase,asserta(question(katz)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Can it be said that Defendant's
expectation of"),
cursor(11,10),write("privacy in his own, or another's,
property is"),
cursor(12,10),write ("socially worthy?"),
cursor(20,30),write("<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple"),affirm.
valid-search if search-warrant;warrant-exception;plainview;
open-field;dog-sniff;surveillance.
plain-view if clearbase,asserta(question(brown)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Was the object of the search in plain
view of"),
cursor(11,10),write("the arresting officers?"),
cursor(20,30),write(' <Y> or <N> or <P> rinciple"),affirm.
open-field if clearbase,asserta(question(oliver)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Was the object of the search
discovered in"),

256
3430
3440
3450
3460
3470
3480
3490
3500
3510
3520
3530
3540
3550
3560
3570
3580
3590
3600
3610
3620
3630
3640
3650
3660
3670
3680
3690
3700
3710
3720
3730
3740
3750
3760
3770
3780
3790
3800
3810
3820
3830
3840
3850
3860
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cursor(11,10),write("an open field by the arresting
officers?"),
cursor(20,30),write(" <Y> or <N> or <P> rinciple"),affirm.
dog-sniff if clearbase,asserta(question(place)),clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Was the object of the search
discovered by a"),
cursor(11,10),write("trained dog which sniffed a container
of some sort?"),
cursor(20,30),write(" <Y> or <N> or <P > rinciple"),affirm.
surveillance if clearbase,asserta(question(knotts)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Was the object of the search
discovered by the"),
cursor(11,10),write("use of an electronic beeper which
revealed nothing more"),
cursor(12,10),write("than what a visual surveillance would
otherwise have"),
cursor(13,10),write("revealed?"),
cursor(20,30),write("<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple"),affirm.
search-warrant if warrant-used,fillerl.
fillerl if basis-knowledge,informant-veracious,
corroborated-facts,self-verifying;good-faith--exception.
warrant-used if clearbase,asserta(question(gates99)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Did the police obtain a search
warrant"),
cursor(11,10),write("before they conducted the search?"),
cursor(20,30),write("<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple"),affirm.
basis-knowledge if clearbase,asserta(question(gatesl)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Did the police get a search warrant
by"),
cursor(11,10),write("relying on an informant who has a
reliable basis"),
cursor(12,10),write("of knowledge?"),
cursor(20,30),write("<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple"),affirm.
informant-veracious if clearbase,asserta(question(gates2)),

1989]
3870
3880
3890
3900
3910
3920
3930
3940
3950
3960
3970
3980
3990
4000
4010
4020
4030
4040
4050
4060
4070
4080
4090
4100
4110
4120
4130
4140
4150
4160
4170
4180
4190
4200
4210
4220
4230
4240
4250
4260
4270
4280
4290
4300
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clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Did the police get a search warrant
by"),
cursor(11,10),write("relying on an informant who is honest
in that"),
cursor(12,10),write("regard?"),
cursor(20,30),write("<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple"),affirm.
corroborated-facts if clearbase,asserta(question(gates3)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Did the police get a search warrant
by"),
cursor(11,10),write("relying on an informant who provided
them with"),
cursor(12,10),write("information which corroborated the
facts in this"),
cursor(13,10),write("case?"),
cursor(20,30),write("<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple"),affirm.
self-verifying if clearbase,asserta(question(gates4)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Did the police get a search warrant
by relying"),
cursor(11,10),write("on an informant whose information was
generally"),
cursor(12,10),write("self-verifying in nature?"),
cursor(20,30),write("<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple"),affirm.
good-faith-exception if not(misleading-affidavit),
not(rubber-stamp-magistrate),not(inadequate-affidavit),
not(facially-deficient).
misleading-affidavit if clearbase,asserta(question(leonl)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Did the police get a search warrant
by"),
cursor(11,10),write("submitting a misleading affidavit to
the issuing"),
cursor(12,10),write("magistrate?"),
cursor(20,30),write(" <Y> or <N> or <P > rinciple"),affirm.
rubber-stamp--magistrate if
clearbase,asserta(question(leon2)),clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Did the police get a search warrant

258
4310
4320
4330
4340
4350
4360
4370
4380
4390
4400
4410
4420
4430
4440
4450
4460
4470
4480
4490
4500
4510
4520
4530
4540
4550
4560
4570
4580
4590
4600
4610
4620
4630
4640
4650
4660
4670
4680
4690
4700
4710
4720
4730
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by"),
cursor(11,10),write("submitting an affidavit to a rubberstamping magistrate?"),
cursor(20,30),write("<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple"),affirm.
inadequate-affidavit if clearbase,asserta(question(leon3)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Did the police get a search warrant
by"),
cursor(11,10),write("submitting an inadequate affidavit to
the issuing magistrate?"),
cursor(20,30),write("<Y> or <N> or <P > rinciple"),affirm.
facially-deficient if clearbase,asserta(question(leon4)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Did the police get a search warrant
by"),
cursor(11,10),write("submitting a facially deficient
affidavit to the"),
cursor(12,10),write("issuing magistrate?"),
cursor(20,30),write(" <Y> or <N> or <P> rinciple"),affirm.
warrant-exception if search-incident-arrest;
exigent-circumstances;
home-arrest;automobile-scope;inventory-search;stopfrisk;
administrative-search;consent-search.
search-incident-arrest if immediate-control;dorm-room;
probable-cause-weapon.
immediate-control if clearbase,asserta(question(chimel)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Did Defendant have a dangerous weapon
within"),
cursor(11,10),write("his immediate control, and did the
search occur"),
cursor(12,10),write("contemporaneously with Defendant's
arrest?"),
cursor(20,30),write(" < Y> or <N> or < P > rinciple"),affirm.
dorm-room if clearbase,asserta(question(chrisman)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Did the arresting officers make a
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4740
4750
4760
4770
4780
4790
4800
4810
4820
4830
4840
4850
4860
4870
4880
4890
4900
4910
4920
4930
4940
4950
4960
4970
4980
4990
5000
5010
5020
5030
5040
5050
5060
5070
5080
5090
5100
5110
5120
5130
5140
5150
5160
5170
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search of"),
cursor(11,10),write("Defendant's residence while
accompanying"),
cursor(12,10),write("Defendant in an effort to monitor his
movements?"),
cursor(20,30),write(" <Y> or <N> or <P > rinciple"),affirm.
probable-cause-weapon if clearbase,
asserta(question(robinson)),clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Did the arresting officers make a
search of"),
cursor(11,10),write("Defendant's person due to a
reasonably held"),
cursor(12,10),write("belief that Defendant was carrying a
concealed"),
cursor(13,10),write("weapon?"),
cursor(20,30),write(" < Y> or <N> or <P > rinciple"),affirm.
exigent--circumstances if destroy-evidence;hot-pursuit;
threat-injury;assistance-victims.
destroy-evidence if clearbase,asserta(question(kalel)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Were there others present at the site
of "),
cursor(11,10),write("Defendant's arrest who might have
destroyed evidence"),
cursor(12,10),write("while the arresting officers would
otherwise have left"),
cursor(13,10),write("to obtain a search warrant?"),
cursor(20,30),write(" <Y> or <N> or <P > rinciple"),affirm.
hot-pursuit if clearbase,asserta(question(kale2)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Did the officers arrest Defendant
while both Defendant"),
cursor(11,10),write("and the officers were in hot pursuit
from the scene of"),
cursor(12,10),write("Defendant's alleged crime?"),
cursor(20,30),write("<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple"),affirm.
threat-injury if clearbase,asserta(question(kale3)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Did Defendant pose a threat of injury
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5180
5190
5200
5210
5220
5230
5240
5250
5260
5270
5280
5290
5300
5310
5320
5330
5340
5350
5360
5370
5380
5390
5400
5410
5420
5430
5440
5450
5460
5470
5480
5490
5500
5510
5520
5530
5540
5550
5560
5570
5580
5590
5600
5610
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to himself or"),
cursor(11,10),write("to others?"),
cursor(20,30),write(" <Y> or <N> or <P > rinciple"),affirm.
assistance-victims if clearbase,asserta(question(thompson)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Were the arresting officers providing
assistance to"),
cursor(11,10),write("victims of Defendant's alleged crime
when they discovered"),
cursor(12,10),write("the evidence in question?"),
cursor(20,30),write("<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple"),affirm.
home-arrest if defendant-home,type--crime.
type-crime if non-routine-felony;gravity-crime.
non-routine-felony if clearbase,asserta(question(payton)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Was a home searched without a warrant
during the"),
cursor(11,10),write("course of Defendant's arrest for a
crime other than a routine"),
cursor(12,10),write("felony?"),
cursor(20,30),write("<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple"),affirm.
gravity-crime if clearbase,asserta(question(welsh)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Did the gravity of the alleged crime
require entry"),
cursor(11,10),write("by the police to enter a home in
order to effect Defendant's arrest?"),
cursor(20,30),write(" <Y> or <N> or <P > rinciple"),affirm.
defendant-home if clearbase,asserta(question(steagald)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Was the search conducted in the home
of a third"),
cursor(11,10),write("party after police officers, while
acting upon an"),
cursor(12,10),write("arrest warrant for Defendant, failed
to find"),
cursor(13,10),write("Defendant at the location stated on
the warrant?"),
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5620
5630
5640
5650
5660
5670
5680
5690
5700
5710
5720
5730
5740
5750
5760
5770
5780
5790
5800
5810
5820
5830
5840
5850
5860
5870
5880
5890
5900
5910
5920
5930
5940
5950
5960
5970
5980
5990
6000
6010
6020
6030
6040
6050
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cursor(20,30),write(" <Y> or <N> or <P> rinciple"),affirm.
automobile-scope if mobile-vehicle;seizable-items;
custodial-arrest.
mobile-vehicle if clearbase,asserta(question(carney)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Was a search made of a readily
mobile"),
cursor(11,10),write("vehicle?"),
cursor(20,30),write("<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple"),affirm.
seizable-items if clearbase,asserta(question(ross)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Was a search made of an automobile by
officers who"),
cursor(11,10),write("had probable cause to believe that
there were seizable items inside?"),
cursor(20,30),write("<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple"),affirm.
custodial-arrest if clearbase,asserta(question(belton)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Was a search made of an automobile by
officers who"),
cursor(11,10),write("had already placed Defendant in
custodial arrest?"),
cursor(20,30),write("<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple"),affirm.
inventory-search if filler2,scope-inventory-search,
incarcerated-inventory-search.
filler2 if clearbase,asserta(question(opperman)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Did police conduct an inventory
search of Defendant's"),
cursor(11,10),write("automobile?"),
cursor(20,30),write(" <Y> or <N> "),affirm.
scope-inventory-search if clearbase,
asserta(question(opperman)),clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Was an inventory search of
Defendant's automobile"),
cursor(11,10),write("confined only to the passenger
compartment, and not"),
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6060

cursor(12,10),write("performed upon the trunk as well?"),

6070
6080
6090
6100
6110
6120
6130
6140
6150
6160
6170
6180
6190
6200
6210
6220
6230
6240
6250
6260
6270
6280
6290
6300
6310
6320
6330
6340
6350
6360
6370
6380
6390
6400
6410
6420
6430
6440
6450
6460
6470
6480
6490

cursor(20,30),write(" < Y > or < N > or < P > rinciple"),affirm.
incarcerated-inventory-search if clearbase,
asserta(question(lafayette)),clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Was an inventory search of
Defendant's automobile"),
cursor(11,10),write("performed after Defendant was
incarcerated?"),
cursor(20,30),write(" <Y> or <N> or <P > rinciple"),affirm.
stop-frisk if carrying-weapon;informant-stop-frisk;
drug-courier;illegal-aliens;specific-articulable;
car-stop-frisk;finger-printing;seizure-apartment.
carrying-weapon if clearbase,asserta(question(terry)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Did the arresting officers search
Defendant's person,"),
cursor(11,10),write("without first moving him to another
location, under reasonable"),
cursor(12,10),write("suspicion that Defendant was carrying
a weapon?"),
cursor(20,30),writeC' <Y> or <N> or <P > rinciple"),affirm.
informant-stop-frisk if clearbase,asserta(question(adams)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Did the arresting officers search
Defendant's person,"),
cursor(11,10),write("without first moving him to another
location, based on a tip"),
cursor(12,10),write("from a reliable informant?"),
cursor(20,30),write("<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple"),affirm.
drug-courier if clearbase,asserta(question(mendenhall)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Did the arresting officers search
Defendant's person"),
cursor(11,10),write("or any of his containers, without
first moving him to another"),
cursor(12,10),write("location, because Defendant appeared
to fit a"),
cursor(13,10),write(" 'drug courier profile'?"),
cursor(20,30),write("<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple"),affirm.
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illegal-aliens if clearbase,asserta(question(delgado)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Was the search conducted in a place
of business in"),
cursor(11,10),write("an attempt by officers to find
illegal aliens?"),
cursor(20,30),write("<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple"),affirm.
specific-articulable if clearbase,asserta(question(place2)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Were/Are the arresting officers able
to provide"),
cursor(11,10),write("specific and articulable facts which
provided"),
cursor(12,10),write ("reasonable suspicion to search
Defendant's"),
cursor(12,10),write("person or containers?"),
cursor(20,30),write(" < Y > or < N > or < P > rinciple"),affirm.
car-stop--frisk if clearbase,asserta(question(long)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Did the arresting officers have
reasonable suspicion to"),
cursor(11,10),write("stop and search Defendant's car, and
did they confine their"),
cursor(12,10),write("search to the passenger compartment
of Defendant's car?"),
cursor(20,30),write("<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple"),affirm.
finger-printing if clearbase,asserta(question(hayes)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Did the search consist of a seizure
of Defendant's person"),
cursor(11,10),write("for the sole purpose of
fingerprinting Defendant?"),
cursor(20,30),write("<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple"),affirm.
seizure-apartment if clearbase,asserta(question(segura)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Did the search consist of a seizure
of a residence while"),
cursor(11,10),write("a search warrant was being
obtained?"),
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cursor(20,30),write("<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple"),affirm.
administrative-search if health-inspection;
school-inspection;liquor-inspection.
health-inspection if clearbase,asserta(question(camara)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Was the search conducted for health
inspection purposes?"),
cursor(20,30),write(" <Y> or <N> or <P > rinciple"),affirm.
school-inspection if clearbase,asserta(question(tlo)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Did the search consist of a school
inspection of students by"),
cursor(11,10),write("school administrators?"),
cursor(20,30),write("<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple"),affirm.
liquor-inspection if clearbase,asserta(question(colonnade)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Did the search consist of a liquor
or firearms inspection by the"),
cursor(11,10),write("apporpriate governing authority?"),
cursor(20,30),write("<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple"),affirm.
consent-search if filler3;filler5.
filler3 if filler4,defendant-voluntary--consent.
filler4 if clearbase,asserta(question(consentl)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Did Defendant consent to the
search?"),
cursor(20,30),write("<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple"),affirm.
defendant-voluntary--consent if right-refuse,
not(subtle--coercion),not(defendant-custody),
not(intimidating-environment),not(inferior-intelligence),
police-contact,not(vulnerable-state-mind),
not(limit-consent).
right-refuse if clearbase,asserta(question(consentl)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Was Defendant aware that he had
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the"),
cursor(11,10),write("right to refuse the search?"),
cursor(20,30),write("<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple"),affirm.
subtle--coercion if clearbase,asserta(question(consent2)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Was Defendant subtly, or otherwise,
coerced"),
cursor(11,10),write("by police officers to give his
consent?"),
cursor(20,30),write("<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple"),affirm.
defendant--custody if clearbase,asserta(question(consent3)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Was Defendant in police custody at
the time when"),
cursor(11,10),write("he gave his consent?"),
cursor(20,30),write(" <Y> or <N> or <P > rinciple"),affirm.
intimidating--environment if clearbase,
asserta(question(consent4)),clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Did Defendant consent to the search
amidst a"),
cursor(11,10),write("generally intimidating
environment?"),
cursor(20,30),write("<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple"),affirm.
inferior-intelligence if clearbase,
asserta(question(consentS)),clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Was Defendant of inferior
intelligence or education"),
cursor(11,10),write("at the time of his consent?"),
cursor(20,30),write("<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple"),affirm.
police-contact if clearbase,asserta(question(consent6)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Did Defendant have sufficient prior
contact with"),
cursor(11,10),write("the police so that he was, more
probably than"),
cursor(12,10),write("not, aware of his right to withhold
consent?"),
cursor(20,30),write(" <Y> or <N> or <P > rinciple"),affirm.
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vulnerable-state-mind if clearbase,
asserta(question(consent7)),clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Was Defendant in a particularly
vulnerable state"),
cursor(11,10),write("of mind at the time when he gave
consent?"),
cursor(20,30),write(" <Y> or <N> or <P > rinciple"),affirm.
limit-consent if clearbase,asserta(question(consent8)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Did Defendant revoke his consent or
limit it"),
cursor(11,10),write("so as to exclude the area which
revealed the"),
cursor(12,10),write("instant evidence?"),
cursor(20,30),write("<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple"),affirm.
filler5 if filler6 and third-party--consent.
filler6 if clearbase,asserta(question(consent9)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Did a third party give his consent to
a search"),
cursor(11,10),write("by police which revealed the instant
evidence?"),
cursor(20,30),write(" < Y > or < N > or < P > rinciple"),affirm.
third-party-consent if -power-authority;possessoryinterest;
defendant-agent;assumed-risk;apparent-authority.
power-authority if clearbase,asserta(question(consent9)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Did the third have the power of
authority to"),
cursor(11,10),write("give his consent?"),
cursor(20,30),write("<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple"),affirm.
possessory-interest if clearbase,
asserta(question(consentl0)),clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Did the third party have a possessory
interest"),
cursor(11,10),write("in the thing searched?"),
cursor(20,30),write(" < Y > or < N > or < P > rinciple"),affirm.
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defendant-agent if clearbase,asserta(question(consentll)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Was the third party acting as
Defendant's"),
cursor(11,10),write("agent when he gave his consent?"),
cursor(20,30),write("<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple"),affirm.
assumed-risk if clearbase,asserta(question(consentl2)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Can it be said that Defendant assumed
the risk"),
cursor(11,10),write("that the third party would give his
consent?"),
cursor(20,30),write(" <Y> or <N> or <P > rinciple"),affirm.
apparent-authority if clearbase,
asserta(question(consentl3)),clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Did the third have the apparent
authority"),
cursor(11,10),write("to give his consent?"),
cursor(20,30),write("<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple"),affirm.
/*
= COMMENT THE FOLLOWING CLAUSES DEAL WITH ISSUES WHICH RELATE
TO EVIDENCE GATHERED THROUGH A CONFESSION BY THE
DEFENDANT TO POLICE.

*/

8540

8550
8560
8570
8580
8590
8600
8610
8620
8630
8640
8650
8660
8670

8680

confession-standing if clearbase,asserta(question(conf)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Is the instant evidence the result of
a confession by"),
cursor(11,10),write("Defendant to the
police?"),
cursor(20,35),write(" <Y> or <N> "),affirm.
valid-confession if miranda-rights,confession-conditions.
valid-confession if waived-miranda-rights,
with-legal--counsel.
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miranda-rights if not(filler9),fillerlo.
filler9 if clearbase,asserta(question(mirandal)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Was Defendant read his Miranda rights
before"),
cursor(11,10),write("he confessed to police?"),
cursor(20,30),write(" <Y> or <N> or <P > rinciple"),affirm.
fillerl0 if not-custody,not-interrogated;
public-safety--exception;not-initiated-proceedings.
not-custody if street--questioned;general--cooperation;
car-briefly-stopped;not-stationhouse;not-police--car;
not-own-home;person-briefly-stopped.
street-questioned if clearbase,asserta(question(mirandal)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Was Defendant questioned by the
police on the street?"),
cursor(20,30),write("<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple"),affirm.
general-cooperation if clearbase,asserta(question(orozco)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Did Defendant voluntarily answer
questions from the"),
cursor(11,10),write("police while they were all on the
street?"),
cursor(20,30),write(" <Y> or <N> or <P> rinciple"),affirm.
car-briefly-stopped if clearbase,
asserta(question(beckimer)),clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Was Defendant's car briefly stopped
by officers in the"),
cursor(11,10),write("flow of traffic for a misdemeanor
traffic violation"),
cursor(12,10),write("during which time he answered police
questions?"),
cursor(20,30),write("<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple"),affirm.
not-stationhouse if clearbase,asserta(question(beckwith)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Did Defendant answer police questions
while he was"),
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cursor(11,10),write("outside of the police stationhouse,
and while he was"),
cursor(12,10),write("otherwise not in police custody?"),
cursor(20,30),write(" <Y> or <N> or <P> rinciple"),affirm.
not-police--car if clearbase,asserta(question(brewerl)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Did Defendant answer police questions
while he"),
cursor(11,10),write("outside of a police car, and while he
was"),
cursor(12,10),write("otherwise not in police custody?"),
cursor(20,30),write("<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple"),affirm.
not-own-home if clearbase,asserta(question(miranda2)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Was Defendant arrested and
interrogated within his own home?"),
cursor(20,30),write(" <Y> or <N> or <P > rinciple"),affirm.
person-briefly-stopped if clearbase,
asserta(question(terry2)),clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Did Defendant answer questions while
he was only briefly stopped?"),
cursor(20,30),write("<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple"),affirm.
not-interrogated if voluntary-statement;indirect-questions;
not(unlikely-elicit-response).
voluntary-statement if clearbase,
asserta(question(miranda3)),clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Were any statements made by Defendant
truly volunteered?"),
cursor(20,30),write("<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple"),affirm.
indirect-questions if clearbase,asserta(question(miranda4)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Were Defendant's statements made in
response to questions"),
cursor(11,10),write("which were only indirect in nature,
e.g., regarding"),
cursor(12,10),write ("his identity?"),
cursor(20,30),write("<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple"),affirm.
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unlikely-elicit-response if clearbase,
asserta(question(innes)),clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Did police carry on a discussion in
Defendant's presence which"),
cursor(11,10),write("was likely to elicit a response from
Defendant?"),
cursor(20,30),write(" < Y> or <N> or < P > rinciple"),affirm.
public-safety--exception if clearbase,
asserta(question(quarrels)),clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Were the police forced to take
immediate action"),
cursor(11,10),write("which caused them to fail to
administer to the"),
cursor(12,10),write("Defendant his Miranda rights?"),
cursor(20,30),write(" <Y> or <N> or <P > rinciple"),affirm.
not-initiated-proceedings if not(not-suspicion-focused);
not(unaccusatory-questions).
not-suspicion-focused if clearbase,
asserta(question(brewer2)),clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Had police suspicion focused on
Defendant when they first"),
cursor(11,10),write("asked him questions; i.e., was he a
primary suspect?"),
cursor(20,30),write("<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple"),affirm.
unaccusatory--questions if clearbase,
asserta(question(escobedo)),clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Were police questions of an
accusatory nature?"),
cursor(20,30),write("<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple"),affirm.
waived-miranda-rights if fillerll,fillerl2.
fillerll if clearbase,
asserta(question(miranda5)),clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Did Defendant waive his Miranda right
to remain"),
cursor(11,10),write("silent immediately prior to the
alleged"),
cursor(12,10),write ("confession?"),
cursor(20,30),write(" <Y> or < N> or < P> rinciple"),affirm.
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fillerl2 if knowingly-intelligently;implied-waiver;
defendant-communicated.
knowingly-intelligently if clearbase,
asserta(question(miranda5)),clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Did Defendant knowingly and
intelligently waive his"),
cursor(11,10),write("Miranda rights?"),
cursor(20,30),write(" <Y> or <N> or <P > rinciple"),affirm.
implied-waiver if clearbase,asserta(question(butler)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Could Defendant's waiver of his
Miranda rights be inferred"),
cursor(11,10),write("from his other words or behavior?"),
cursor(20,30),write(" < Y> or <N> or <P > rinciple"),affirm.
with-legal--counsel if clearbase,
asserta(question(miranda6)),clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Was Defendant in the presence of his
legal counsel when he"),
cursor(11,10),write("answered police questions?"),
cursor(20,30),write(" < Y> or <N> or <P> rinciple"),affirm.
not-interrogation-restarted if miranda-again;
unrelated-crime;defendant-communicated.
miranda-again if clearbase,
asserta(question(miranda7)),clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Was interrogation restarted after
Defendant refused to speak,"),
cursor(11,10),write("and was Defendant re-read his Miranda
rights?"),
cursor(20,30),write("<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple"),affirm.
unrelated-crime if clearbase,
asserta(question(mosley)),clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Was interrogation restarted
concerning an unrelated crime?"),
cursor(20,30),write("<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple"),affirm.
defendant-communicated if clearbase,
asserta(question(bradshaw)),clearwindow,
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cursor(10,10),write("Did Defendant restart further
communication of his own avail?"),
cursor(20,30),write(" <Y> or <N> or <P> rinciple"),affirm.
confession-conditions if voluntary-confession;
independent-proof.
voluntary-confession if totality--circumstances;not(filler7).
totality-circumstances if not(abusive-method),
not(poor-condition),not(police-force).
abusive-method if clearbase,asserta(question(confessionl)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Did the police use abusive methods to
elicit a confession from"),
cursor(11,10),write("Defendant?"),
cursor(20,30),write("<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple"),affirm.
poor-condition if clearbase,asserta(question(confession2)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Was Defendant in poor mental or
physical condition"),
cursor(11,10),write("at the time of his confession?"),
cursor(20,30),write(" <Y> or <N> or <P > rinciple"),affirm.
police-force if clearbase,asserta(question(confession3)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Did the police use force, threats or
deception to elicit a"),
cursor(11,10),write ("confession from Defendant?"),
cursor(20,30),write(" <Y> or <N> or <P> rinciple"),affirm.
independent-proof if clearbase,asserta(question(jackson)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Was there proof, independent of
Defendant's confession,"),
cursor(11,10),write("that he committed the alleged
crime?"),
cursor(20,30),write("<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple"),affirm.
filler7 if filler8,unnecessary-delay.
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filler8 if clearbase,asserta(question(confession4)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Was there a substantial delay between
the time"),
cursor(11,10),write("of Defendant's arrest and his
arraignment"),
cursor(12,10),write("during which time the Defendant
confessed?"),
cursor(20,30),write(" <Y> or <N> or <P> rinciple"),affirm.
unnecessary-delay if testimony--conflicts;
not(judge-unavailable).
testimony-conflicts if clearbase,asserta(question(mcnab)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Did the delay cause Defendant's
confession to"),
cursor(11,10),write("conflict with his testimony at the
time of his"),
cursor(12,10),write("trial?"),
cursor(20,30),write(" < Y > or < N > or < P > rinciple"),affirm.
judge-unavailable if clearbase,
asserta(question(confession4)),clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("Was the delay due to the
unavailiability of a judge"),
cursor(11,10),write("to arraign Defendant?"),
cursor(20,30),write("<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple"),affirm.
/*
-

COMMENT

-

11200
11210
11220

THE FOLLOWING "FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE" CLAUSES

11230

POLICE CONDUCT TO BE ADMITTED AT TRIAL.

ENABLE EVIDENCE WHICH WAS OBTAINED BY UNLAWFUL

11240----*/
11250
11260 fruit-poisonous-tree if independent-source;
11270
inevitable--discovery;attenuated-chain.
11280
11290 independent-source if clearbase,asserta(question(segura2)),
11300
clearwindow,
11310
cursor(10,10),write("If the police conducted an illegal
11320
search or obtained an illegal"),
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11330
11340

cursor(11,10),write ("confession, was the same evidence
discovered or discoverable"),

11350
11360
11370
11380
11390
11400
11410
11420
11430
11440
11450
11460
11470
11480
11490
11500
11510
11520
11530
11540
11550
11560
11570
11580

cursor(12,10),write("through an independent source?"),
cursor(20,30),write("<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple"),affirm.

11590
11600
11610
11620
11630

inevitable-discovery if clearbase,asserta(question(nix)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("If the police conducted an illegal
search or obtained an illegal"),
cursor(11,10),write("confession, would the same evidence
inevitably have been"),
cursor(12,10),write ("discovered nonetheless?"),
cursor(20,30),write("<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple"),affirm.
attenuated-chain if clearbase,asserta(question(wongsun)),
clearwindow,
cursor(10,10),write("If the police conducted an illegal
search or obtained an illegal"),
cursor(11,10),write("confession, was the causal link
between the illegal action and"),
cursor(12,10),write("the evidence attenuated?"),
cursor(20,30),write(" <Y> or <N> or <P > rinciple"),affirm.
/*
COMMENT

=

THE FOLLOWING CLAUSES DEAL WITH THE PRINCIPLES
WHICH UNDERLIE THE CONFESSION AND SEARCH CLAUSES
ABOVE. THESE ARE THE MESSAGES WHICH ARE DISPLAYED
ON THE COMPUTER SCREEN WHEN THE USER PRESSES THE
LETTER "P".

11640-*/
11650
11660 explanation(rawlingsl,"If Defendant's own property was
11670
searched, he must have an expectation of privacy in such
11680
property for standing to contest admissibility of the
11790
evidence. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 100 S.Ct.
11700
2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 [1980].").
11710
11720 explanation(rawlings2,"If a third party's property was
11730
searched, Defendant must have an expectation of privacy in
11740
such property for standing to contest admissibility of the
11750
evidence. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 100 S.Ct.
11760
2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 [1980].").
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explanation(katz,"Defendant's expectation of privacy in
searched property must be considered a socially worthy
expectation for standing to contest admissibility of the
evidence. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct.
507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 [1967].").
explanation(brown,"Evidence obtained without a search
warrant by a police officer who observed the evidence in
'plain view' is admissible at trial. Texas v. Brown, 460
U.S. 730, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 [1983].").
explanation(oliver,"Evidence obtained without a search
warrant by a police officer who observed the evidence in
an 'open field' is admissible at trial. Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214
[1984].").
explanation(place,"Evidence obtained without a search
warrant with the use of a drug detection dog that sniffs
personal luggage in public areas is admissible at trial.
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77
L.Ed.2d 110 [1983].").
explanation(knotts,"Evidence obtained with the warrantless
use of an electronic beeper is admissible only insofar as
it must have been discoverable by visual surveillance from
a public place. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276,
103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 [1983].").
explanation(gates99,"Unless police rely upon a search
warrant exception, they must first obtain a warrant before
they conduct a search. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103
S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 [1983].").
explanation(gatesl,"If police rely on an informant to obtain
a search warrant, the evidence is admissible only if the
informant has a reliable basis of knowledge to 'tip' the
police. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76
L.Ed.2d 527 [1983].").
explanation(gates2,"If police rely on an informant to obtain
a search warrant which reveals the evidence in question,
the warrant is valid only insofar as the informant is
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honest in that regard. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103
S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 [1983].").
explanation(gates3,"If police rely on an informant to obtain
a search warrant, the evidence revealed is admissible only
if the facts of the case corroborate the information
provided by the informant. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 [19831.").
explanation(gates4,"If police rely on an informant to obtain
a search warrant, the evidence revealed is admissible only
if the information provided by the informant is 'selfverifying' in nature. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103
S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 [1983].").
explanation(leonl,"If police submitted a misleading
affidavit to a magistrate in order to obtain a search
warrant, then that warrant is invalid. United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 [1984].").
explanation(leon2,"If police submitted an affidavit to a
'rubber-stamping' magistrate in order to obtain a search
warrant, then that warrant is invalid. United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 [1984].").
explanation(leon3,"If police submitted an inadequate
affidavit to a magistrate in order to obtain a search
warrant, then that warrant is invalid. United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 [1984].").
explanation(leon4,"If police submitted a facially deficient
affidavit to a magistrate in order to obtain a search
warrant, then that warrant is invalid. United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 [1984].").
explanation(chimel,"Police officers may make a warrantless
search of an arrestee's person or home only insofar as the
search is incidental to, or contemporaneous with,
custodial arrest. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89
S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 [1969].").
explanation(chrisman,"Police officers may conduct a
warrantless search of an arrestee's residence while
accompanying Defendant in order to monitor his/her
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movements. Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 102 S.Ct.
812, 70 L.Ed.2d 778 [1982].").
explanation(robinson,"Police officers may conduct a
warrantless search of an arrestee's person only if the
officer has a reasonably held belief that the arrestee is
carrying a concealed weapon. United States v. Robinson,
414 U.S. 218, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 [1973].").
explanation(valel,"Police officers may conduct a warrantless
search of an arrestee's premises where others are present
who may destroy vital evidence while the officer takes the
arrestee to police headquarters. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S.
30, 90 S.Ct. 1969, 26 L.Ed.2d 409 [1970].").
explanation(vale2,"Police officers may conduct a warrantless
search of an arrestee's premises only insofar as the
arrest was made after the officers were in 'hot pursuit'
of the arrestee from the scene of an alleged crime.
Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 90 S.Ct. 1969,
26 L.Ed.2d 409 [1970].").
explanation(vale3,"Police officers may conduct a warrantless
search of an arrestee and the area within his immediate
control if the arrestee poses a threat to himself or to
others. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 90 S.Ct. 1969, 26
L.Ed.2d 409 [1970].").
explanation(thompson,"Police officers may conduct a
warrantless search of an arrestee's premises in order to
find victims or other suspects. Thompson v. Louisiana, 469
U.S. 17, 105 S.Ct. 409, 83 L.Ed.2d 246 [1984].").
explanation(payton,"Police officers may make an arrest
within the arrestee's home only if the arrest is for
something other than a routine felony. Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639
[1980].").
explanation(welsh,"Police officers may make an arrest within
the arrestee's home only if the gravity of the underlying
offense necessitates doing so. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466
U.S. 740, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 [1984].").
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explanation(steagald,"Evidence is inadmissible where police
officers act upon an arrest warrant, enter the home of a
third party, and discover the evidence in plain view.
Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S.Ct. 1642,
68 L.Ed.2d 38 [1981].").
explanation(carney,"Police officers may make a warrantless
search, incident to arrest, of any readily mobile vehicle.
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 85 L.Ed.2d
406 [1985].").
explanation(ross,"Police officers may make a warrantless
search of any part of an automobile if they have probable
cause to believe that there are seizable items therein.
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72
L.Ed.2d 572 [1982].").
explanation(belton,"Police officers may make a warrantless
search of an automobile only if the driver has already
been place in custodial arrest. New York v. Belton, 453
U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 [1981].").
explanation(opperman,"Police officers may make an inventory
search of an arrestee's impounded automobile which extends
only to the passenger compartment, and to containers
therein. State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673 (S.D.
1976).").
explanation(lafayette,"Police officers may conduct an
inventory search of an arrestee's impounded automobile
only after the arrestee has been incarcerated. Lafayette,
462 U.S. 640, 103 S.Ct. 2605, 77 L.Ed.2d 65 [1983].").
explanation(terry,"Police officers may 'stop and frisk' a
person only insofar as they have resonable suspicion to
believe that he/she is carrying a dangerous weapon. Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889
[1968].").
explanation(adams,"Police officers may make a warrantless
search of a person based on information from a reliable
informant. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct.
1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 [1972].").

1989]

13480
13490
13500
13510
13520
13530
13540
13550
13560
13570
13580
13590
13600
13610
13620
13630
13640
13650
13660
13670
13680
13690
13700
13710
13720
13730
13740
13750
13760
13770
13780
13790
13800
13810
13820
13830
13840
13850
13860
13870
13880
13890

COMMON LAW REASONING
explanation(mendenhall,"Police officers may make a
warrantless search of a person, or any of his containers,
if that person fits a 'drug courier profile.' United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64
L.Ed.2d 497 [1980].").
explanation(delgado,"Police officers may stop and frisk
individuals in a place of business where such officers are
attempting to discover illegal aliens. Immigration and
Naturalization Serv. v. DelGado, 466 U.S. 210, 104 S.Ct.
1758, 80 L.Ed.2d 247 [1984].").
explanation(place2,"Evidence obtained without a search
warrant in public areas is admissible only if the officers
provide specific and articulable facts which create a
reasonable suspicion. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696,
103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 [1983].").
explanation(long,"Evidence obtained by officers from a
warrantless search of an automobile is admissible only if
the search was limited to the passenger compartment.
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d
1201 [1983].").
explanation(hayes,"A person may be seized and detained for
fingerprinting purposes, given probable cause. Hayes v.
Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 105 S.Ct. 1643, 84 L.Ed.2d 705 [1985].").
explanation(segura,"Police officers may seize and occupy an
arrestee's residence while other officers leave to obtain
a search warrant. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796,
104 S.Ct. 3380, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 [1984].").
explanation(camara,"Evidence obtained from a health
inspection is admissible at trial. Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930
[1967].").
explanation(tlo,"Evidence obtained from an inspection of
students by school administrators is admissible at trial.
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 105 S.Ct. 733, 85 L.Ed.2d
720 [1985].").
explanation(colonnade,"Evidence obtained from a state liquor
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and firearms inspection may be admitted at trial.
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 90
S.Ct. 774, 25 L.Ed.2d 60 [1970].").
explanation(consentl"Evidence obtained from a consenting
Defendant is admissible only insofar as the Defendant knew
that he had the right to refuse the search. Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854
[1973].").
explanation(consent2, "Evidence obtained from a consenting
Defendant is admissible only insofar as the Defendant was
neither expressly nor subtly coerced. Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854
[1973].").
explanation(consent3,"Evidence obtained from a consenting
Defendant is admissible only insofar as the Defendant was
not in police custody at the time. Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854
[1973].").
explanation(consent4,"Evidence obtained from a consenting
Defendant is admissible only insofar as the Defendant was
not subjected to an intimidating environment. Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854
[1973].").
explanation(consent5,"Evidence obtained from a consenting
Defendant is admissible only insofar as the Defendant is
not of low intelligence or poor education. Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854
[1973].").
explanation(consent6, "Evidence obtained from a consenting
Defendant is admissible if the Defendant has had prior
contact with the police. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 [1973].").
explanation(consent7,"Evidence obtained from a consenting
Defendant is admissible only insofar as the Defendant was
not in a vulnerable state of mind. Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854
[1973].").
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explanation(consent8,"Evidence obtained from a consenting
Defendant is admissible only if the Defendant's words or
conduct did not limit his consent so as to exclude the
searched area. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,
93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 [1973].").
explanation(consent9,"Evidence obtained by police who relied
upon the consent of a third party is admissible only
insofar as the third party had the authority to give his
consent. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93
S.Ct.2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 [1973].").
explanation(consentl0,"Evidence obtained by police who
relied upon the consent of a third party is admissible if
the third party had a possessory interest in the thing
searched. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93
S.Ct.2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 [1973].").
explanation(consentll,"Evidence obtained by police who
relied upon the consent of a third party is admissible if
the third party acted as Defendant's agent. Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct.2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854
[1973].").
explanation(consentl2,"Evidence obtained by police who
relied upon the consent of a third party is admissible if
the Defenant assumed the risk that a third party would
give his consent. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218, 93 S.Ct.2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 [1973].").
explanation(consentl3,"Evidence obtained by police who
relied upon the consent of a third party is admissible if
the third party had apparent authority to give his
consent. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93
S.Ct.2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 [1973].").
explanation(confessionl,"A confession obtained by police who
used abusive methods to elicit the confession is not
admissible as evidence at trial. Jackson v. Denno, 378
U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 [1964].").
explanation(confession2,"A confession obtained by police
from an arrestee who is in poor physical or mental
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condition is not admissible at trial. Jackson v. Denno,
378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 [1964].").
explanation(confession3,"A confession obtained by police who
used force, threats, or deception to elicit the confession
is not admissible as evidence at trial. Jackson v. Denno,
378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 [1964].").
explanation(confession4,"A confession is inadmissible if it
is made during a long delay between arrest and
arraignment, unless the delay was caused by the
unavailability of a judge. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S.
368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 [1964].").
explanation(jackson,"A confession is inadmissible unless
there is also some independent proof linking Defendant to
the crime. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774,
12 L.Ed.2d 908 [1964].").
explanation(mcnab,"A confession made during an inexcusably
long delay between the time of arrest and arraignment is
inadmissible at a federal trial. McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819 [1943].").
explanation(mirandal,"Answers to non-intrusive police
questions made briefly on the street are admissible at
trial. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602,
16 L.Ed.2d 694 [1966].").
explanation(orozco,"Answers made voluntarily to police by an
arrestee who generally cooperates are admissible at trial.
Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 89 S.Ct. 1095, 22 L.Ed.2d
311 [1969].").
explanation(beckimer,"Miranda warnings must be administered
before Defendant may answer questions by police officers
who stopped Defendant's car in traffic for a misdemeanor
traffic violation. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 104
S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 [1984].").
explanation(beckwith,"Miranda warnings need not be given
before Defendant answers police in a comfortable
environment outside the stationhouse, e.g., in Defendant's
own home. Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 96
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S.Ct. 1612, 48 L.Ed.2d 1 [1976].").
explanation(brewerl,"Miranda warnings must be administered
to Defendant who answers questions in a police car.
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51
L.Ed.2d 424 [1977].").
explanation(miranda2,"Miranda warnings need not be
administered to Defendant within his/her own home because
he/she is not yet in custody. Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 [1966].").
explanation(terry2,"Miranda warnings need not be
administered to Defendant who has been only briefly
stopped by officers on the street. Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 [1968].").
explanation(miranda3,"Miranda warnings need not be
administered for answers which are truly volunteered.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16
L.Ed.2d 694 [1966].").
explanation(miranda4,"Miranda warnings need not be
administered for questions which are indirect or nonintrusive in nature. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86
S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 [1966].").
explanation(innes,"Statements are inadmissible where Miranda
rights have not been read, and officers' conversation was
likely to elicit Defendant's response. Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424
[1977].").
explanation(quarrels,"Miranda warnings need not be given
where exigent circumstances required the officer to obtain
an immediate answer from Defendant. New York v. Quarles,
467 U.S. 649, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 [1984].").
explanation(miranda5,"A confession obtained from Defendant
who has waived his Miranda rights is admissible only
insofar as Defendant knowingly intelligently waived his
rights. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602,
16 L.Ed.2d 694 [1966].").
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explanation(butler,"A confession obtained from Defendant is
admissible if a waiver of his Miranda rights could have
been inferred from Defendant's words or behavior.
North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 60
L.Ed.2d 286 [1979].").
explanation(miranda6,"A confession from Defendant must be
made in the presence of Defendant's legal counsel, unless
Defendant has waived his right to counsel. Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694
[1966].").
explanation(brewer2,"Miranda rights must be administered to
Defendant if police suspicion has focused on Defendant.
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51
L.Ed.2d 424 [1977].").
explanation(escobedo,"Miranda rights must be administered to
Defendant before police ask questions of an accusatory
nature. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct.
1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 [1964].").
explanation(miranda7,"If Defendant refuses to answer
questions after having his/her Miranda rights
administered, Miranda warnings must again be given if
police initiate further questioning. Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 [1966].").
explanation(mosley,"If Defendant refuses to answer questions
after having his/her Miranda rights administered, then any
statements made by Defendant are admissible if police
initiate questioning with regard to another unrelated
crime. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46
L.Ed.2d 313 [1975].").
explanation(bradshaw,"If Defendant refuses to answer
questions after Miranda rights were read, Miranda warnings
need not be re-read where Defendant voluntarily reinitiates communication with police. Oregon v. Bradshaw,
462 U.S. 1039, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 [1983].").
explanation(segura2,"Evidence obtained by an illegal
search or confession is admissible where such evidence was
discoverable through a means independent from the illegal
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activity. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 104 S.Ct.
3380, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 [1984].").
explanation(nix,"Evidence obtained by an illegal search or
confession is admissible where such evidence would
nevertheless have been inevitably discovered by police.
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d
377 [1984].").
explanation(wongsun,"Evidence obtained by an illegal search
or confession is admissible where the causal link between
the illegal activity and discovery of the evidence is
attenuated. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83
S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 [1963].").
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APPENDIX B
A SAMPLE RUN-THROUGH OF CACTUS
<PANEL 1>

Type "CACTUS"

CACTUS
HELLO.
Welcome to CACTUS, the
Computer Aided Criminal Trial Evidence
Admissibility Heuristic.
This program will enable the user to determine
whether evidence obtained either by
a search or confession may be admitted at a
criminal trial.
NOTE: Where a letter response is requested
by CACTUS, respond with only a single
letter: 'Y', 'N', or 'P'.
<HIT ANY KEY>
Type any key
<PANEL 2>
CACTUS
Is the instant evidence the result of a
confession by Defendant to the police?
Y > or < N > or < P > rinciple
Type "N"

COMMON LAW REASONING

1989]

<PANEL 3>
CACTUS
Was the Defendant the target of a search
by the police?
< Y > or < N > or < P > rinciple
Type "Y"
<PANEL 4>
CACTUS
Did Defendant have a legitimate expectation of privacy
in his own property which was the subject of a search?
<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple
Type "P"
<PANEL5>
CACTUS
PRINCIPLE
If Defendant's own property was searched, he must have
an expectation of privacy in such property for standing
to contest admissibility of the evidence. Rawlings v.
Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633
(1980).
HIT ANY KEY

Type any key
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<PANEL 6>

CACTUS
Did Defendant have a legitimate expectation of privacy
in his own property which was the subject of a search?
<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple
Type "N"

<PANEL7>
CACTUS
Did Defendant have a legitimate expectation of privacy
in the property of another which was the subject of a
search?
<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple
Type "Y"
<PANEL 8>
CACTUS
Can it be said that Defendant's expectation of privacy in
his own, or another's, property is socially worthy?
<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple
Type "Y"
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<PANEL 9>
CACTUS
Did the police obtain a search warrant before they
conducted the search?
<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple

Type "N"

<PANEL 10 >
CACTUS
Did Defendant have a dangerous weapon within his
immediate control, and did the search occur
contemporaneously with Defendant's arrest?
< Y > or < N > or < P > rinciple
Type "P"

<PANEL 11>
CACTUS

PRINCIPLE
Police officers may make a warrantless search of an
arrestee's person or home only insofar as the search is
incidental to, or contemporaneous with, custodial arrest.
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23
L.Ed.2d 685 (1969).
HIT ANY KEY

Type any key
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<PANEL 12 >

CACTUS
Did Defendant have a dangerous weapon within his
immediate control, and did the search occur
contemporaneously with Defendant's arrest?
<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple
Type "Y"
<PANEL 13 >
CACTUS
Did the arresting officers make a search of Defendant's
residence while accompanying Defendant in order to
monitor his movements?
<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple
Type "N"
<PANEL 14 >
CACTUS
Did the arresting officers make a search of Defendant's
person due to a reasonably held belief that Defendant
was carrying a concealed weapon?
<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple
Type "N"
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<PANEL 15 >
CACTUS
Were there others present at the site of Defendant's
arrest who might have destroyed evidence while the
arresting officers would otherwise have left to obtain a
search warrant?
<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple
Type "Y"
<PANEL 16 >
CACTUS
Did the officers arrest Defendant while both Defendant
and the officers were in hot pursuit from the scene of
Defendant's alleged crime?
<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple
Type "N"
<PANEL 17 >
CACTUS
Did Defendant pose a threat of injury to himself or to
others?
<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple
Type "Y"
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<PANEL 18 >

CACTUS
Were the arresting officers providing assistance to
victims of Defendant's alleged crime when they
discovered the evidence in question?
<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple
Type "N"
<PANEL 19 >
CACTUS
Was a home searched without a warrant during the
course of Defendant's arrest for a crime other than a
routine felony?
< Y > or < N > or < P > rinciple
Type "Y"
<PANEL 20 >
CACTUS
Was a search made of a readily mobile vehicle?
<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple
Type "N"

COMMON LAW REASONING
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<PANEL 21 >
CACTUS
Was a search made of an automobile by officers who had
probable cause to believe that there were seizable items
inside?
<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple
Type "N"
<PANEL 22 >
CACTUS
Was a search made of an automobile by officers who had
already placed Defendant in custodial arrest?
< Y > or < N > or < P > rinciple
Type "N"
<PANEL 23 >
CACTUS
Did police conduct an inventory search of Defendant's
automobile?
<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple
Type "N"
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<PANEL 24 >

CACTUS
Did the arresting officers search Defendant's person,
without first moving him to another location, under
reasonable suspicion that Defendant was carrying a
weapon?
< Y > or < N > or < P > rinciple
Type "N"
<PANEL 25>
CACTUS
Did the arresting officers search Defendant's person,
without first moving him to another location, based on a
tip from a reliable informant?
Y > or < N > or < P > rinciple
Type "N"
<PANEL 26>
CACTUS
Did the arresting officers search Defendant's person, or
any of his containers, without first moving him to
another location, because Defendant appeared to fit a
drug courier profile?
<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple
Type "N"

COMMON LAW REASONING

1989]

<PANEL 27>
CACTUS
Was the search conducted in a place of business in an
attempt by officers to find illegal aliens?
<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple
Type "N"
<PANEL 28>
CACTUS
Were/Are the arresting officers able to provide specific
and articulable facts which provided reasonable
suspicion to search Defendant's person or containers?
<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple
Type "N"
<PANEL 29>
CACTUS
Did the arresting officers have reasonable suspicion to
stop and search Defendant's car, and did they confine
their search to the passenger compartment of
Defendant's car?
<Y > or < N > or < P > rinciple
Type "N"
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<PANEL 30>

CACTUS
Did the search consist of a seizure of Defendant's person
for the sole purpose of fingerprinting Defendant?
<Y > or <N > or < P > rinciple
Type "N"

<PANEL 31>
CACTUS
Did the search consist of a seizure of a residence while a
search warrant was being obtained?
<Y > or < N > or <P > rinciple
Type "N"

<PANEL 32>
CACTUS
Was the
purposes?

search

conducted

for

health

inspection

<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple
Type "N"

<PANEL 33>
CACTUS
Did the search consist of a school inspection of students
by school administrators?
<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple
Type "N"

1989]

COMMON LAW REASONING
<PANEL 34 >
CACTUS
Did the search consist of a liquor or firearms inspection
by the appropriate governing authority?

< Y > or < N > or < P > rinciple
Type "N"

<PANEL 35>
CACTUS
Did Defendant consent to the search?
<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple
Type "N"

<PANEL 36>
CACTUS
Did a third party give his consent to a search by police
which revealed the instant evidence?
<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple
Type "N"

<PANEL 37 >
CACTUS
If the police conducted an illegal search or or obtained
an illegal confession, was the same evidence discovered
or discoverable through an independent source?
<Y> or <N> or <P>rinciple
Type "Y"

[Vol. IX
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<PANEL 38>
CACTUS DETERMINATION

The evidence is ADMISSIBLE at Defendant's trial

